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MILLION DOLLAR BABIES DO NOT WANT TO SHARE:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST ISSUES SURROUNDING
BOXING AND MIXED MARTIAL ARTS AND
WAYS TO IMPROVE COMBAT SPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Coined by some as the “biggest fight in combat sports history”
and “the money fight,” on August 26, 2017, Ultimate Fighting
Championship (UFC) mixed martial arts (MMA) superstar, Conor
McGregor, crossed over to boxing to take on the biggest name in
the sport, the undefeated Floyd Mayweather.1  The fight is esti-
mated to have received over 4.5 million pay-per-view buys, which
brings it close to the all-time pay-per-view record.2  Although the
actual figures have been kept secret due to a confidentiality agree-
ment, it is estimated that Mayweather earned $230 million and Mc-
Gregor earned $70 million.3  The fight was surprisingly competitive,
but ultimately ended with Mayweather defeating McGregor via
technical knockout in the tenth round and retiring with a perfect
50–0 record as one of the richest athletes of all time.4  In light of
1. Floyd Mayweather Jr. vs. Conor McGregor: “The Money Fight”, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.si.com/boxing/photo/2017/08/27/floyd-
mayweather-jr-vs-conor-mcgregor-money-fight [https://perma.cc/7BEC-NR7T]
(showcasing photos from fight).
2. See A.J. Perez & Steven Marrocco, Mayweather vs. McGregor: Fight Nears Record
for Pay-Per-View Buys, USA TODAY (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/boxing/2017/09/01/floyd-mayweather-conor-mcgregor-showtime-
pay-per-view-numbers/626671001/ [https://perma.cc/JQ44-HA5S] (detailing esti-
mated final numbers for fight which are yet to be determined according to Show-
time executive vice president Stephen Espinoza).  The pay-per-view record of 4.6
million purchases was set in 2015 by Mayweather when he fought Manny Pacquiao.
See id.
3. See What Is the Prize Money for McGregor vs Mayweather and How Much Did Floyd
Mayweather Jnr. Take Home?, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 30, 2017, 9:29 AM), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/boxing/0/prize-money-mcgregor-vs-mayweather-much-purse-will-win-
ner-get/ [https://perma.cc/U88M-5DKL] (detailing estimated fight purses, which
depend largely on ultimate pay-per-view numbers and variety of other variables).
The Nevada State Athletic Commission confirmed that the absolute minimum
each fighter earned was $100 million for Mayweather and $30 million for McGre-
gor, although it is estimated their actual purses far exceeded that. See id.
4. See Rob Woollard, Fifty and out as Mayweather Stops Brave McGregor, YAHOO!
SPORTS (Aug. 27, 2017, 7:05 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/boxing-fifty-mayweath
er-stops-brave-mcgregor-053959523—box.html [https://perma.cc/N2WL-RHJB]
(detailing Mayweather-McGregor fight).  “After this fight, Mayweather should join
Michael Jordan and Tiger Woods as the first three athletes to make more than $1
billion.” See Ahiza Garcia, Floyd Mayweather Will Join Billionaire Athletes Club, CNN
MONEY (Sept. 5, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/27/news/companies/
(409)
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this unique fight, and the fact that McGregor made more in his
professional boxing debut than he did in all the fights of his UFC
career combined, the question of how fighters are compensated in
MMA compared to professional boxing becomes prevalent.5
A recent study analyzed all the payouts in professional boxing
and MMA events held in Nevada, Florida, and California, and the
evidence showed that boxers, on average, make more money than
their MMA counterparts.6  In addition, the study showed that al-
most all the high-paying purses in MMA are paid out to fighters in
the UFC, which is by far the most dominant promotional company
in the sport.7  This discrepancy in pay, however, is not due to the
sport of boxing itself generating more money than MMA.8  To the
contrary, the UFC has seen higher revenues than boxing in recent
years, and “[t]he UFC’s FOX deal pays almost twice as much as that
of the HBO and Showtime’s current boxing budgets combined.
The UFC also regularly sells more pay-per-views and generates more
revenue per year than boxing does.”9  When asked about possible
causes of this discrepancy in pay, professionals involved in the busi-
ness of both sports indicated three major reasons: the “lack of com-
petition in MMA, the power of the UFC brand, and the presence of
federal law covering boxing.”10
floyd-mayweather-billionaire-athletes/index.html [https://perma.cc/7JW3-NBZF]
(quoting CEO of Mayweather Promotions, Leonard Ellerbe).  In addition to break-
ing financial records, Mayweather broke the record for longest undefeated streak
in boxing, previously held by legend Rocky Marciano. See Josh Peter, Floyd
Mayweather Eclipses Rocky Marciano’s Career Mark with Win vs. Conor McGregor, USA
TODAY (Aug. 27, 2017, 8:43 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/box-
ing/2017/08/26/floyd-mayweather-passes-rocky-marciano-wins-record/
605894001/ [https://perma.cc/Y6JW-557Z] (detailing Mayweather breaking Mar-
ciano’s long held record of 49-0).
5. See Bryanna Fissouri, MMA and Boxing Are Both Better for Mayweather vs Mc-
Gregor, BOXING INSIDER, https://www.boxinginsider.com/columns/mma-still-wins-
despite-mcgregors-defeat/ [https://perma.cc/9RM2-FGBF] (last visited Aug. 27,
2017) (explaining that McGregor has been vocal proponent for increased pay in
UFC, but made millions more in his very first professional boxing bout).
6. See John S. Nash, Why Do Boxers Make More than MMA Fighters?, BLOODY EL-
BOW (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2016/8/23/12512178/why-
do-boxers-make-more-than-mma-fighters [https://perma.cc/P23N-E9ML] (analyz-
ing pay distributions for professional boxing and MMA events in several states).
7. See id. (explaining discrepancy between UFC fighter purses and fighters in
other MMA promotions).
8. See id. (explaining boxing does not in fact generate more revenue per year
than UFC).
9. Id. (comparing UFC’s deal with FOX, to deals to broadcast boxing on HBO
and Showtime).
10. Id. (citing reasons given by managers, promoters, and attorneys, for pay
discrepancy between MMA athletes and professional boxers).
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Despite the factors previously noted as contributing to MMA
fighters earning less on average than their boxing counterparts,
those same factors have also contributed to MMA’s rapid growth in
popularity.11  In a way, many of the UFC’s areas of strength are also
professional boxing’s areas of weakness, and former UFC owner,
Lorenzo Fertitta, has even stated that “[b]oxing provide[s] a tre-
mendous roadmap, from a case study standpoint, as far as what to
do and what not to do.  It fe[els] like boxing ha[s] become too
fragmented, [with] too many titles at too many weights.”12  It is no
secret that professional boxing has been declining in popularity for
years, which is due in part to the success of the UFC drawing away
fans, but is primarily due to an excessive number of sanctioning
bodies awarding too many championship belts across a plethora of
weight classes, in addition to problems with corruption and diffi-
culty organizing fights between rival promotions.13
A prime example of a fight that helped boxing in the short
term, but also highlighted key issues in the sport, was the 2015 fight
11. See Andy Bull, The Fight Game Reloaded: How MMA and UFC Conquered the
World, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2016, 8:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/
2016/mar/04/the-fight-game-reloaded-how-mma-conquered-world-ufc [https://
perma.cc/YXC3-L9F4] (explaining how UFC rose to prominence and business tac-
tics used to grow popularity of MMA in United States).
12. Id. (quoting Lorenzo Fertitta, “[t]oday, the UFC has eight weight classes.
Boxing has 17, multiplied by the many different governing bodies”).
13. See Zachary Alapi, 7 Creative Changes for Boxing to Catch Back Up to MMA,
BLEACHERREPORT (Sept. 12, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1332450-
7-creative-changes-for-boxing-to-catch-back-up-to-mma [https://perma.cc/K9AX-
JU6E] (discussing potential changes for sport of boxing which could help it regain
popularity). See also Boxing Enters Somewhere Behind Golf: Fixing the Sweet Science’s
Irrelevance in the American Sports Culture, BAD LEFT HOOK (Feb. 14, 2012, 9:52 PM),
https://www.badlefthook.com/2012/2/14/2798986/boxing-american-main-
stream-sports-culture-analysis [https://perma.cc/U7RF-A2D7] (examining
problems in boxing which have led it to become increasingly irrelevant in sports
culture today).
In 1926 . . . [Ring magazine], began awarding belts to the world cham-
pion in each weight division in boxing, and for the next 50 years these
belts were one of the greatest prizes to be gained in the sport.  By the late
1980’s the major sanctioning bodies that governed much of boxing (the
International Boxing Federation, World Boxing Council, and World Box-
ing Association) were each awarding their own belts to their champions.
Given the proliferation of champions because of the number of sanction-
ing groups and the increasing number of weight divisions, in the 1980’s
Ring magazine stopped its practice of awarding a belt to each champion
and instead awarded belts to only undisputed champions.
Michael Poliakoff et al., Boxing, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica
.com/sports/boxing [https://perma.cc/DPP5-76GG] (last visited Aug. 12, 2017).
For further discussion of sanctioning organizations, see infra notes 148–155 and
accompanying text.
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between Floyd Mayweather and Manny Pacquiao.14  The fight was
one that fans wanted to see for years, however issues over the terms
of the fight, as well as animosity between Pacquiao’s promoter, Top
Rank, and Mayweather’s own company, Mayweather Promotions,
resulted in years of delay.15  Because boxing lacks any central con-
trol, the past decade has seen individual interests frequently get in
the way of organizing the most compelling fights.16  “[B]oxers are
essentially freelancers who look to their promoters to create fights
and define their futures. . . . [However] [t]he business of boxing is
brutal, and there’s tremendous infighting as the men behind the
boxers strive for market supremacy.”17  When the Mayweather-Pac-
quiao fight finally happened, it shattered records as predicted,
bringing in 4.4 million pay-per-view buys and generating a total of
more than $500 million—$350 million of which went to the fight-
ers.18  Despite these incredible numbers and its advertisement as
the “fight of the century,” the fight was relatively lackluster and re-
sulted in Mayweather winning an easy decision victory, which left
many fans disappointed.19
In contrast to professional boxing, MMA experiences very few
problems staging highly anticipated matchups between top fighters
because the best fighters in the sport are (for the most-part) signed
14. See Gary Andrew Poole, The Fight to Organize the Fight of the Century, ATLAN-
TIC (May 2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/
05/mayweather-versus-pacquiao/392036/ [https://perma.cc/PV2J-BE5P] (dis-
cussing reasons why Mayweather vs. Pacquiao took so long to organize).
15. See id. (describing nature of rivalry between promoters who aligned with
rival television companies).  Top Rank partnered with HBO, while Mayweather
Promotions partnered with Showtime, which resulted in further difficulty organiz-
ing a fight. See id.
16. See id. (describing factors that contributed to difficulty in organizing
Mayweather vs. Pacquiao).
17. Id. (describing how business of professional boxing operates).
18. See Cork Gaines, The Mayweather-Pacquiao Fight Numbers Are in—They Shat-
tered Expectations by Tens of Millions of Dollars, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 12, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/floyd-mayweather-manny-pacquiao-revenue-
2015-5 [https://perma.cc/3HEW-K66M] (“That shatters the previous record of
2.48 million PPV buys set by Mayweather and Oscar De La Hoya in 2007, and it
blows away the pre-fight estimates of 3.0-3.8 million buys.”).
19. See Kelefa Sanneh, Ultimate Fighting Versus Boxing, NEW YORKER (May 22,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/ultimate-fighting-versus-
boxing [https://perma.cc/L39M-XSUQ] (analyzing anti-climactic mega-fight’s im-
pact on boxing and how it competes with UFC).  In addition to disappointing fans,
the fight opened the door to dozens of lawsuits filed by fans who accused Pacquiao
of “misleading them by not disclosing a shoulder injury that, he said, prevented
him from being his best.” Id.
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with one promotion, the UFC.20  In addition, UFC president, Dana
White, often publicly admonishes fighters who put on dull fights
and rewards fighters with bonuses for exciting bouts.21  The UFC’s
business model is one that directly benefits itself, as the promoter,
because the “UFC is their own league and they appoint their own
champion who is going to fight for the title.  Everything is
done within while in boxing [there are] different sanctioning bod-
ies . . . . [The UFC is] a promoter, regulator, sanctioning body,
everything.”22
In light of this clear advantage that the UFC has over boxing’s
chaotic atmosphere, there have been renewed efforts by some of
boxing’s biggest players to make the sport more orderly.23  In par-
ticular, in 2015, notorious boxing manager, Al Haymon, launched
Premier Boxing Champions (“PBC”), a television series backed by
Waddell & Reed, which has broadcast deals with several networks.24
As a result of Haymon’s efforts, he was met with an antitrust lawsuit
from Oscar De La Hoya’s Golden Boy Promotions, which claimed
that Haymon engaged in anticompetitive behavior.25  In 2017, a
judge in the Central District of California granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment in a detailed opinion, which essen-
20. See Nash, supra note 6 (“[A]ccording to the Fight Matrix rankings, every R
male fighter in the top three of their division and roughly 85% of all top 10 fight-
ers in the ten divisions that the UFC promotes are under contract with the UFC.”).
21. Sanneh, supra note 19 (“In the U.F.C., White is known for his willingness R
to criticize fighters, even winning ones, who fail to entertain; fighters can also earn
fifty-thousand-dollar bonuses for exciting performances.  Boxing doesn’t have a
boss to browbeat fighters who disappoint, or a system to directly reward ones who
excel.”).
22. Nash, supra note 6 (quoting interview with Warriors Boxing executive R
Leon Margules).
23. See Sanneh, supra note 19 (describing advent of PBC in comparison to R
UFC).
24. See id. (“Mayweather’s powerful adviser, Al Haymon, announced the
launch of Premier Boxing Champions (PBC), a series backed by [asset manage-
ment company] Waddell & Reed, [which] has broadcast arrangements with NBC
and CBS, as well as a number of cable networks . . . [and took over] boxing pro-
gramming on ESPN, replacing “Friday Night Fights,” a long-running boxing and
boxing news show.”).  Investment firm Waddell & Reed invested $500 million in
PBC in 2015. See How Good is the PBC for Boxing, UCN LIVE (Apr. 26, 2016), http://
ucnlive.com/how-good-is-pbc-for-boxing/ [https://perma.cc/7FFB-X8PR] (pro-
viding overview of how PBC came to be and its effects on boxing).  “Haymon’s
PBC, is now in the midst of a potential UFC-style takeover, right down to the pro-
duction and streamlined teams.” Patrick Connor, Bigger than Antitrust: Boxing and
the Ali Act, BAD LEFT HOOK (May 19, 2015), https://www.badlefthook.com/2015/
5/19/8627119/bigger-than-antitrust-boxing-and-the-ali-act [https://perma.cc/
DL59-WUJV].
25. See Golden Boy Promotions, LLC v. Haymon, No. CV 15-3378-JFW, 2017
WL 460736, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2017) (concerning Golden Boy Promotions,
LLC lawsuit against Haymon).
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tially stated that Golden Boy had been unable to present any evi-
dence of harm to competition or anticompetitive business
practices.26
This comment aims to conduct an overall comparison of pro-
fessional boxing and MMA, the legal issues the sports face today
and what changes can be made to improve the futures of the sports
and the livelihoods of the fighters.27  In Part II, this comment will
discuss the background and history of the sports of boxing and
MMA, give an overview of federal laws that are relevant to the dis-
cussion, and discuss recent antitrust litigation in both sports.28  Part
III(A) will analyze the differences between the structures of boxing
and MMA, and discuss why boxing’s structure is the direct cause of
its problems.29  Part III(B) will discuss the UFC’s monopoly on
MMA and its effects on fighters, as well as the impact of the
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act.30  And Part III(C) will explain
why the current litigation facing the UFC, Le v. Zuffa,31 though simi-
lar to the recent antitrust lawsuit of Golden Boy Promotions, LLC v.
Haymon (“Golden Boy”),32 is more likely to succeed.33  Additionally,
this section will offer ways in which both sports can be improved.34
This article argues that boxing and MMA should learn from one
another to improve both themselves and the economic well-being
of the fighters.35  Boxing should form a more coherent, organized
system with fewer weight classes and sanctioning bodies, and MMA
should be subject to the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act (“Ali
Act”) to protect fighters from getting taken advantage of by the
UFC, which dominates the sport.36
26. See id. at *19 (describing holding).
27. For further discussion of the backgrounds of boxing and MMA, see infra
notes 37–98 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the legal issues the R
sports face today and what changes can be made, see infra notes 141–280 and R
accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 37–140 and accompanying text (explaining background of R
boxing and MMA).
29. See infra notes 148–182 and accompanying text (analyzing problems due R
to structure of boxing and UFC dominance).
30. See infra notes 183–229 (analyzing UFC and effects of Muhammad Ali R
Boxing Reform Act).
31. 216 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Nev. 2016).
32. No. CV 15-3378-JFW, 2017 WL 460736 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2017).
33. See infra notes 230–271 and accompanying text (comparing cases). R
34. See infra notes 230–271 and accompanying text (comparing cases). R
35. For further discussion of the problems professional boxing and MMA face
and the solutions, see infra notes 141–147 and accompanying text. R
36. For further discussion of the problems professional boxing and MMA face
and the solutions, see infra notes 148–280 and accompanying text. R
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II. BACKGROUND OF BOXING AND MIXED MARTIAL ARTS
A. The Sweet Science’s Sour History
The sport of boxing, fondly referred to as “the sweet science,”
has ancient origins and was prevalent in ancient Egyptian, Greek,
and Roman cultures.37  After the rise of Christianity and the fall of
the Roman Empire, boxing disappeared for centuries until it
reemerged in 1681, when a formal bareknuckle bout was recorded
to have taken place in London for the first time.38  The first formal
set of rules for boxing known as the “Broughton Rules,” were
adopted in 1743, followed by the London Prize Ring Rules in 1838,
and finally the Marquis of Queensberry Rules in 1867 (which are
the rules that govern boxing today).39  The Queensberry Rules in-
troduced the use of gloves and timed rounds of three minutes each,
and instituted the rule that any fighter who was knocked down, and
could not get back up within ten seconds, was declared knocked
out and the fight was over.40
Boxing remained illegal in Britain and the United States for
most of the 19th century, due to its perception as a “throwback to a
less-civilized past.”41  However, relaxed enforcement of the law and
boxing’s ever-growing popularity caused authorities to reconsider
its value in society around the end of the nineteenth century, and,
as dominance in the sport started to shift from England to America,
prize-fighting was finally legalized and regulated by New York in
1896.42  The twentieth century saw professional boxing grow into a
big business and become a path to riches for various ethnic groups
in the United States.43  Although some states resisted legalization
due to concerns about encouraging violent behavior, by 1920
nearly all states had legalized boxing.44  Once boxing was legalized,
37. Poliakoff et al., supra note 13 (describing ancient origins of boxing). R
38. See id. (describing boxing’s disappearance from society for hundreds of
years until its reemergence in Great Britain in seventeenth century).
39. See John McCain & Ken Nahigian, A Fighting Chance for Professional Boxing,
15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 9 (2004) (describing modern history of boxing).
40. See Boxing’s Legal Status, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/sports/boxing [https://perma.cc/7FF4-9FVH] (last visited Aug. 27,
2017) (describing history of boxing beginning in England).
41. Id. (“Perceived by the courts as a throwback to a less-civilized past,
prizefighting was classified as an affray, an assault, and a riot.”).
42. See McCain & Nahigian, supra note 39, at 10 (describing history of boxing R
in America).
43. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 40 (detailing how boxing was R
practiced widely by Irish and Italian immigrants, as well as Jewish and African
Americans).
44. See McCain & Nahigan, supra note 39, at 11 (describing evolution of legali- R
zation of boxing in United States).
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the emergence of radio and television played an important role in
growing the audience, and the sport ultimately became extremely
popular.45  This newfound technology and popularity enabled
twentieth century boxers such as Jack Dempsey, Joe Louis, Ray
Robinson, Rocky Marciano, Muhammad Ali, and Ray Leonard to
become American icons.46
1. Problems with Corruption: Business of Boxing Was Not a Fair Fight
Unsurprisingly, as boxing and its stars began to grow in popu-
larity, promoters consistently attempted to maximize profits and, in
doing so, frequently exploited the athletes.47  By the middle of the
twentieth century, the influence organized crime became problem-
atic and the International Boxing Club of New York (“IBC”) essen-
tially operated as a front for the mafia.48  The corruption brought
by organized crime led to “fixed fights, bribed judges, and boxing
promotions [used] as front[s] for gambling and money laundering
schemes.”49  In 1953, the Department of Justice launched an investi-
gation and filed a civil antitrust action against the IBC, claiming
violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sher-
man Act”).50  The Supreme Court held, in United States v. Interna-
45. See id. (explaining evolution of boxing in America). See also ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, supra note 40 (“After World War II television took on an increasingly R
important role in professional boxing.  Because of its popularity and relatively low
production costs compared with other sports, professional boxing became a regu-
lar feature of network programming throughout much of the 1950’s and early
‘60s.”).
46. See The Best Boxers of the 20th Century, RANKER, http://www.ranker.com/
list/best-boxers-of-the-20th-century/ranker-sports (last visited Aug. 28, 2017) (list-
ing best boxers of twentieth century).  This list is in chronological order by decade
and is not comprehensive. See id.
47. See McCain & Nahigan, supra note 39, at 11 (explaining rise of exploita- R
tion of professional boxers in twentieth century).
48. See McCain, supra note 39, at 11–12 (explaining corruption of IBC and R
organized crime’s impact on boxing in 1950s).  Organized crime also directly ex-
torted some fighters, such as Joe Louis. See id.
49. See id. at 11 (explaining corruption of IBC and organized crime’s impact
on boxing in 1950s).  Organized crime also directly extorted some fighters, such as
Joe Louis. See id.
50. See United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955)
(stating that other corporations and individuals named as defendants included
Madison Square Garden Corporation, James D. Norris, and Arthur M. Wirtz). See
also Katherine Figueroa, The Twelfth Round: Will Boxing Save Itself? 36 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 171, 176 (2016) (explaining how DOJ alleged defendants in International
Boxing Club of N.Y. restrained and monopolized “the promotion, exhibition, broad-
casting, telecasting, and motion picture production and distribution of profes-
sional championship boxing contests in the United States”).  For further
discussion of the Sherman Act, see infra notes 99–107 and accompanying text. R
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tional Boxing Club of New York,51 that the defendants engaged in
interstate commerce when promoting professional boxing contests,
and, therefore, the Sherman Act applied to the sport, unlike profes-
sional baseball which is exempt.52
The Supreme Court decision in International Boxing Club of New
York encouraged Congress to keep a close eye on boxing, which
continued to experience persistent problems with corruption in
subsequent decades.53  Crooked promoters, such as Don King, be-
came famous for questionable business practices, but, nonetheless,
promoted seven of Muhammad Ali’s bouts, as well as the bouts of
other legendary fighters such as Sugar Ray Leonard, Leon Spinks,
Roberto Dura´n, Julio Ce´sar Cha´vez, Mike Tyson, Evander Holyfield,
and Felix Trinidad, from the 1970s to the 1990s.54  King was criti-
cized for his coercive contractual clause that “required a boxer who
wished to challenge a fighter belonging to King to agree to be pro-
moted by King in the future should he win.  Thus, no matter which
boxer won, King represented the winner.”55  In addition, King was
investigated by the FBI for allegedly paying off the International
Boxing Federation (“IBF”) for the purposes of obtaining better
rankings for his fighters.56  Don King was perhaps the most infa-
mous boxing promoter, but he was not the only one.57  Complaints
concerning the rankings of all the various professional boxing orga-
nizations—such as the World Boxing Council (“WBC”), the World
Boxing Association (“WBA”), and the IBF—favoring particular pro-
moters over others have been widespread for years.58
51. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
52. See id. at 241–45 (holding because boxing constituted interstate com-
merce, government could proceed with trial to prove defendants had conspired to
monopolize market for championship boxing in United States).
53. See Figueroa, supra note 50, at 176 (“Beginning in 1960, Senator Estes R
Kefauver, Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, com-
menced a four-year investigation into the sport.”).
54. See Don King, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/bi-
ography/Don-King [https://perma.cc/2C3D-GEJD] (last visited Aug. 27, 2017)
(detailing life of Don King and fighters that sued him).
55. Id. (describing coercive contracts used by Don King).
56. See id. (explaining that FBI seized thousands of documents related to
King’s illegal business practices).
57. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 40 (discussing issues regarding R
rankings of professional boxing organizations).
58. See id. (discussing issues regarding rankings of professional boxing organi-
zations).  For further discussion of the various professional boxing organizations,
see infra notes 151–155 and accompanying text.
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2. The Year 2000 and Onward: In the Later Rounds, Boxing Is on the
Ropes
During the 1990s, heavyweight champion, Mike Tyson, became
an international superstar, known for his incredible knockout
power and violent nature both in and out of the ring.59  Every time
Tyson fought, it became a massive media event.60  Tyson also con-
tributed one of the most shocking moments in boxing history,
when he bit off a piece of Evander Holyfield’s ear during a televised
championship fight in 1997.61  The spectacle momentarily placed
boxing back in the limelight, however the overall health of the
sport continued to decline.62  Since the advent of the twenty-first
century, boxing lost a significant amount of its relevance in Ameri-
can sports culture.63  The sport that previously dominated front
page news “entered 2012 somewhere behind golf, auto racing and
poker . . . on the American sports hierarchy.”64  Although boxing
has declined in popularity, it has not been completely knocked
out.65  As previously noted, many speculate that the rise of MMA—
which is spearheaded by the UFC and its president, Dana White—
59. See Steve Silverman, Boxing: Breaking Down the Steady Decline of the Sweet Sci-
ence, BLEACHERREPORT (Oct. 13, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1370083-boxing-breaking-down-the-steady-decline-of-the-sweet-science [https://
perma.cc/ENZ5-ECA6] (examining factors which have led to decline in popularity
of boxing).
60. See id. (explaining how Mike Tyson captivated America).
61. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 40 (detailing Tyson’s infamous R
moment when he bit off Holyfield’s ear, as well as when he tried to fight Lennox
Lewis at press conference in 2002 and was subsequently denied license by Nevada
Athletic Commission).
62. See Silverman, supra note 59 (examining factors which have led to decline R
in popularity of boxing).
63. See id. (examining factors which have led to decline in popularity of
boxing).
64. Boxing Enters Somewhere Behind Golf: Fixing the Sweet Science’s Irrelevance in the
American Sports Culture, supra note 13 (examining problems in boxing which have R
led it to become increasingly irrelevant in sports culture today).
65. Clyde Haberman, Boxing Is a Brutal, Fading Sport. Could Football Be Next?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/us/boxing-is-a-
brutal-fading-sport-could-football-be-next.html (explaining decline of boxing in
sports culture).
[T]he vaunted prizefighting of old is on the ropes. News media attention
tends to be scant.  Major bouts, such as they are, are consigned to pay-per-
view showings.  Once in a while, a fighter comes along to stir excitement,
a Floyd Mayweather Jr. or a Manny Pacquiao, but that’s the exception.
The professional ranks today are mired in a bewildering array of weight
divisions—[seventeen] where once there were eight—and in an alphabet
soup of multiple sanctioning organizations.
Id.
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol25/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS206.txt unknown Seq: 11 26-JUN-18 12:26
2018] MILLION DOLLAR BABIES DO NOT WANT TO SHARE 419
has contributed to boxing’s decreased popularity, due to the much
more straightforward nature of the sport.66
B. The Rapid Rise of Mixed Martial Arts: A Challenger Emerges
to End Boxing’s Reign
Although MMA is a very new sport in modern American cul-
ture, it has ancient roots like boxing.67  In 648 B.C., the ancient
Greeks created a sport called “pankration,” where, unlike wrestling,
the object was to fight until one man admitted defeat.68  Pankration
had “no weight divisions, no time limits, and the combatants were
confined to a twelve by fourteen-foot square.”69  Pankration compe-
tition remained a popular spectator event from the thirty-third
Olympiad until Roman Emperor Theodosius outlawed the Olympic
Games in the fourth century.70  Forms of mixed combat did not
reemerge until the 1920s, when Vale Tudo became popularized in
Brazil, which was a sport that utilized various fighting styles such as
Muay Thai, Luta Livre wrestling, boxing, and a new discipline
called Brazilian jiu-jitsu.71
The sport of MMA mixes different martial arts and fighting
styles from around the world, which is exactly what the name im-
plies.72  For many years, people pondered which of the various mar-
tial arts and fighting styles is the most superior.73  The earliest
semblances of MMA matches in twentieth-century America were ex-
hibition bouts—where practitioners of various different fighting
styles would compete against one another—notably include when
Muhammad Ali fought Japanese professional wrestler, Antonio In-
66. See Silverman, supra note 59 (examining factors which have led to decline R
in popularity of boxing).
67. See Jeffrey B. Same, Comment, Breaking the Chokehold: An Analysis of Poten-
tial Defenses Against Coercive Contracts in Mixed Martial Arts, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1057, 1061–62 (2012) (discussing ancient origins of MMA in Greece known as
Pankration).
68. See id. (discussing ancient origins of MMA in Greece known as
Pankration).
69. Michael Kim, Mixed Martial Arts: The Evolution of a Combat Sport and Its
Laws and Regulations, 17 SPORTS L.J. 49, 50–51 (2010) (discussing historical origins
of MMA).
70. See Same, supra note 67, at 1061–62 (discussing disappearance of MMA for R
centuries).
71. See id. at 1062 (discussing reemergence of Mixed forms of combat in Bra-
zil). Vale Tudo is translated as “anything goes.” See Kim, supra note 69, at 51. R
72. See Brendan Maher, Understanding and Regulating the Sport of Mixed Martial
Arts, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 209, 214 (2009) (“MMA is a hybrid combat
sport whose participants engage in and combine a variety of fighting disciplines
within one match.”).
73. See id. at 214–15 (explaining origins of MMA).
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oki, and when “Judo” Gene Lebell fought professional boxer, Milo
Savage.74  However, by the 1990s, the age-old question of which
fighting discipline is the best remained.75  Brazilian jiu-jitsu pio-
neer, Rorion Gracie, attempted to answer that question in 1992,
when he partnered with Art Davie and Bob Meyrowitz to establish
the UFC.76
1. MMA in America and the Ultimate Fighting Championship’s Fight
to Survive
The first UFC event was an eight-man, single-elimination tour-
nament which featured “a kickboxer, a savate fighter, a karate ex-
pert, a shootfighter, a sumo wrestler, a professional boxer, and
Rorion’s younger brother, a Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu blackbelt named
Royce Grace.”77  Originally, the UFC had minimal rules and was
promoted simply “as a competition to determine the most effective
martial art.”78  The UFC was designed to be an “anything-goes”
competition, without rounds, weight classes, judges, or safety equip-
ment.79  This strategy of promoting the UFC as a “blood sport”
caused it to find massive pay-per-view success, and it became the
most-watched non-boxing pay-per-view event in history.80
This bold marketing technique, however, also prompted back-
lash from politicians and lawmakers, ironically including Senator
John McCain, who led efforts to ban MMA altogether despite his
steadfast support of boxing.81  In light of this criticism and political
pressure, the UFC took steps to make the sport more respectable,
74. See id. at 214 (detailing twentieth century exhibition bouts took place be-
tween boxers, wrestlers, and other marital artists); Steven Rondina, Before
Mayweather-McGregor: History’s Most Famous, Notorious Crossover Fights, BLEACHERRE-
PORT (Aug. 7, 2017), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2724947-before-may
weather-mcgregor-historys-most-famous-notorious-crossover-fights [https://perma
.cc/Z25K-ZJU8] (detailing twentieth century exhibition bouts took place between
boxers, wrestlers, and other marital artists).  Gene Lebell is revered as a founding
father of American mixed martial arts, and he was the first person to show that
styles like judo were very effective against boxing. See id.
75. See Maher, supra note 72, at 215 (explaining premise upon which UFC was R
built).
76. See Same, supra note 67, at 1062 (explaining how UFC came to be). R
77. Kim, supra note 69, at 51 (detailing first UFC tournament). R
78. See The UFC, UFC, http://www.ufc.com/discover/ufc/index [https://per
ma.cc/X74Y-T35X] (last visited Aug. 12, 2017) (describing origins of UFC).
79. See Same, supra note 67, at 1062 (describing how UFC events were mar- R
keted early on); see also Maher, supra note 72, at 125–26. R
80. See Same, supra note 67, at 1063 (detailing UFC’s early success). R
81. See id. (“Most notably, Senator John McCain of Arizona took the floor of
the United States Senate in 1996, characterized the sport as ‘human cockfighting’
and urged the states to prohibit or ban the sport altogether.”).
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such as introducing weight classes, banning kicks to downed oppo-
nents, instituting five-minute rounds, and increasing involvement
with state athletic commissions.82  In 2001, casino executives, Frank
and Lorenzo Fertitta, formed Zuffa, LLC, purchased the UFC for
$2 million, and continued the effort to implement a set of unified
rules and regulations in order to legitimize the sport.83  Zuffa ap-
proached various athletic commissions in an attempt to seek out
independent regulation, and, ultimately, it combined rules from
“the Olympic sports of Greco-Roman and Freestyle wrestling, box-
ing, taekwondo and judo,” to create the unified rules of MMA,
which now consists of an eight-page rule book.84  As the UFC
evolved, so did MMA athletes, and today, professional MMA is a
sport where “hybrid athletes are required to know various disci-
plines in order to compete at an elite level in a regulated environ-
ment where safety is paramount.”85
2. The UFC Knocks Out Its Competition
The UFC spearheaded efforts to legitimize the sport of MMA
over the next decade, and, under the supervision of its President,
Dana White, it became “the fastest-growing sports organization in
the world, [and now] also boasts the most successful and longest-
running sports reality show in history, The Ultimate Fighter.”86  In
2011, the UFC officially became part of American mainstream
sports culture when it secured a landmark seven-year deal to be
broadcast by FOX Sports.87  Three years later, in July of 2015, the
UFC signed a six-year, $70 million sponsorship deal with Reebok,
and, today, “the UFC produces more than 40 live events annually
and is the largest Pay-Per-View event provider in the world, broad-
casting in over 129 countries and territories, to nearly 800 million
TV households worldwide, in 28 different languages.”88
82. See Kim, supra note 69, at 52 (discussing changes that UFC made to clean R
up its image due to political backlash).
83. See id at 52–53 (discussing Zuffa’s purchase of UFC).
84. See Bull, supra note 11 (explaining how UFC rose to prominence and busi- R
ness tactics used to grow popularity of MMA in United States).
85. The UFC, UFC, http://www.ufc.com/discover/ufc/index [https://perma
.cc/ZC7Q-TGU6] (last visited Aug. 12, 2017) (summarizing legitimate safety stan-
dards of UFC).
86. Id. (summarizing history of UFC’s rise to prominence in mainstream
sports culture).
87. See id. (“In 2011, the UFC burst into the mainstream with a landmark
seven-year broadcast agreement with FOX Sports Media Group.”).
88. Id. (detailing how large UFC has grown today).
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During the course of the UFC’s rise to the top, Zuffa systemati-
cally bought out the competition.89  Rival promotions, such as
World Fighting Alliance (“WFA”), Pride, International Fight
League (“IFL”), World Extreme Cagefighting (“WEC”), and
Strikeforce, were all eliminated by Zuffa in the same way from 2006
to 2013: their content library and fighter contracts were acquired,
and they were subsequently disbanded.90  In acquiring the fighter
contracts of those organizations, the UFC enlisted major interna-
tional stars, such as “Mauricio ‘Shogun’ Rua, Wanderlei Silva, Nick
Diaz, Jose Aldo, [and] Urijah Faber, [who] have all produced in-
creased revenue streams for the UFC, and at the same time diluted
the talent pool outside the UFC.”91  Today, the UFC has essentially
taken over the entire sport of MMA, with its only major competition
coming from Viacom-owned Bellator and the World Series of Fight-
ing (“WSOF”).92
In June 2016, Frank and Lorenzo Fertitta sold the UFC for $4
billion to a group led by William Morris Endeavor-International
Marketing Group (“WME-IMG”), and Dana White stayed on as
President.93  This sum set a record for the largest purchase in sports
history, and with it, Zuffa netted a 2,000% return on its original
purchase price of $2 million in 2001.94  Despite its phenomenal suc-
cess, the UFC faced some controversy in recent years when the Fed-
89. See Chris Harty, 5 MMA Organizations Bought out by UFC, RICHEST (Jan. 16,
2014), http://www.therichest.com/sports/mma-sports/5-mma-organizations-
bought-out-by-ufc/ [https://perma.cc/73YW-RT6K] (listing process by which
Zuffa acquired and disbanded rival MMA promotions).
90. See id. (listing process by which Zuffa acquired and disbanded rival MMA
promotions).
91. Greg Byron, Industry Dominance: The UFC and Its ‘Monopoly’ in the MMA
Market, MMA CORNER (Jan. 24, 2014), http://themmacorner.com/2014/01/24/
industry-dominance-the-ufc-and-its-monopoly-in-the-mma-market/ [https://perma
.cc/9PFC-LYSC] (describing how UFC cornered MMA market).
92. See id. (describing how UFC cornered MMA market).  In response to alle-
gations that the UFC was a monopoly, Dana White cited UFC’s major competitor,
Viacom’s Bellator, when he stated, “[a]s far as the other thing that he said that
we’re a monopoly, Viacom is our competitor . . . . They have a $40 billion dollar
market cap—$40 billion dollars.  I’m never going to see $40 billion as long as I
live, neither will the UFC.  So, we’re not a monopoly either.” Id.
93. See Meet the New Owners Who Paid $4 billion to Buy the UFC, FOX SPORTS (July
11, 2016), http://www.foxsports.com/ufc/story/ufc-sold-new-owners-ari-emanuel-
wme-img-patrick-whitesell-4-billion-071116 [https://perma.cc/G3UY-3XUE] (ex-
amining those involved in purchase of UFC by conglomerate WME-IMG).
94. See Robby Kalland & Adam Silverstein, UFC Sells for $4 Billion to WME-IMG
Group, Dana White Remains President, CBS SPORTS (July 11, 2016), https://www.cbss-
ports.com/mma/news/reports-ufc-sells-for-4-billion-to-wme-img-dana-white-re-
mains-president/ [https://perma.cc/MS8U-APMW] (detailing consequences of
UFC’s sale).  “WME-IMG are joined by a Michael Dell-headed private equity group
and global investment firm KKR as UFC’s new ownership group.” Id.
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eral Trade Commission’s (FTC) Bureau of Competition opened an
antitrust investigation of Zuffa in 2011, after its purchase of the
fight promotion, Strikeforce.95  That investigation was ultimately
closed in 2012.96  However, disputes with fighters who allege the
UFC engages in coercive and monopolistic practices continue to
persist and have culminated in an ongoing antitrust lawsuit which
was filed in 2014.97  As a result of this problem, many in the MMA
community have asserted that the Ali Act, which was passed in 2000
to regulate boxing, should be extended to regulate MMA.98
C. A Preliminary Look at the Sherman Act and the Muhammad
Ali Boxing Reform Act
1. The Sherman Act Ensures the Competition Can Fight for the Belt
The Sherman Act prohibits restraint of trade and monopolies
in all major industries, including the sports industry, which means
it is applicable to boxing and MMA.99  The relevant portions of the
Sherman Act, which was enacted by Congress in 1890 and was the
first and most important federal antitrust law, are as follows:
Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.
Section 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
95. See Brett Okamoto, Court Denies UFC Motion to Dismiss Antitrust Charges; Suit
Moves Forward, ESPN (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/
13741330/court-denies-ufc-motion-dismiss-antitrust-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/
BBY4-6WQD] (explaining that judge denied UFC’s motion to dismiss lawsuit of
former fighters, despite FTC having found no wrongdoing in 2012).
96. See id. (explaining that 2012 FTC investigation into UFC found no
wrongdoing).
97. See id. (explaining that judge denied UFC’s motion to dismiss lawsuit of
former fighters). See also Complaint at 2, Golden Boy Promotions, LLC v.
Haymon, No. CV 15-3378-JFW, 2017 WL 460736 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2017) (detail-
ing plaintiff’s pleadings).  For further discussion of the lawsuit, see infra notes
135–139 and accompanying text. R
98. See Marc Raimondi, Click Debate: What’s All This Talk About the Ali Act Com-
ing to MMA?, MMA FIGHTING (June 12, 2016), https://www.mmafighting.com/
2016/6/12/11911444/click-debate-whats-all-this-talk-about-the-ali-act-coming-to-
mma [https://perma.cc/2N9R-7FR9] (discussing potential for Ali Act to apply to
MMA). See also 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012) (detailing regulations on professional box-
ing).  For further discussion of the Ali Act, see infra notes 108–117 and accompany- R
ing text.  For further discussion of Congress’s effort to extend the Ali Act to MMA,
see infra note 117 and accompanying text. R
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see also infra notes 99–107 (explaining Sherman R
Act and its application).
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person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.100
The Sherman Act promotes competition so long as it enhances
allocative efficiency, but condemns acts that harm competitors with-
out producing offsetting gains in efficiency.101  To establish liability
under Section 1, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the existence of an
agreement, and (2) that the agreement was an unreasonable re-
straint of trade.”102  In order to establish a violation of Section 2,
plaintiffs must demonstrate four elements: “(1) specific intent to
control prices or destroy competition; (2) predatory or anticompe-
titive conduct directed at accomplishing that purpose; (3) a danger-
ous probability of achieving ‘monopoly power’; and (4) causal
antitrust injury.”103
Essentially, in an effort to maintain competition in business,
the Sherman Act made agreements “in restraint of trade” illegal, as
well as attempts to monopolize.104  The Sherman Act is aimed “not
against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against
conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.”105  In
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,106 the Supreme Court
stated “the Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive char-
ter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade.”107
100. Id. §§ 1–2.
101. See John Stevens, Antitrust Law and Open Access to the NREN, 38 VILL. L.
REV. 571, 576 (1993) (discussing Sherman Act).
102. Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir.
2016).
103. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1432–33 (9th Cir.
1995).
104. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia
.com/history/united-states-and-canada/us-history/sherman-antitrust-act [https://
perma.cc/8T5H-L8FC] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (providing an overview of Sher-
man Act).
105. Aerotec Int’l, 836 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuil-
lan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)).
106. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
107. Id. at 4. See generally The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www
.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws
[https://perma.cc/Z3Z8-9WX9] (last visited Aug. 12, 2017) (giving overview of 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7).
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2. The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: Professional Boxing’s
Referee
The Ali Act, is a federal law that was introduced in 1999 and
enacted on May 26, 2000 by the 106th Congress to “(1) protect the
rights and welfare of professional boxers, (2) aid state boxing com-
missions with the oversight of boxing, and (3) increase sportsman-
ship and integrity within the boxing industry.”108  In passing the Ali
Act, Congress made the following findings:
(1) Professional boxing is not governed by any league, as-
sociation, or any form of an established organization like
majority of other professional sports.  (2) The state offi-
cials are not ensuring the protection of the boxers and are
not aware or informed of contracts boxers have agreed to.
(3) Promoters are taking advantage of the sport by con-
ducting dishonest business affairs. Promoters are not be-
ing punished due to some states being less strict about the
legal terms that are stated in contracts.  (4) There is no
rating system provided to rank professional boxers thus
ratings are subjected to manipulation by those in charge.
(5) There has been a major interference in the sport be-
cause of open competition by restrictive and anti-competi-
tive bodies.  (6) There are no restrictions placed on
contracts that boxers agree to with promoters and manag-
ers. It is necessary to enforce a national contract reform
which will guarantee the safety of professional boxers and
the public from unlawful contracts and to enhance the in-
tegrity of the sport.109
Essentially, the Ali Act was passed in response to rampant cor-
ruption and exploitation of boxers by promoters and was subject to
congressional hearings and investigations for decades.110  Promot-
108. 145 CONG. REC. 28886 (1999) (stating purpose of Ali Act). See generally
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II 1996), amended
by 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012) (detailing regulations on professional boxing).
109. John S. Nash, Coker on Expanding the Ali Act to MMA: ‘I Think It’s a Pretty
Good Idea’, BLOODY ELBOW (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2015/
8/11/9125603/ufc-mma-bellator-scott-coker-interview-ali-act [https://perma.cc/
N38G-4DXN].  Nash provides a summary of Congress’s findings in reference to the
Ali Act, which was published in the United Statutes at Large in 2000. See Muham-
mad Ali Boxing Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 106-210, 144 STAT. 322(3) (2000), https:/
/www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-114/pdf/STATUTE-114-Pg321.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BZP7-87DW].
110. See Scott Baglio, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: The First Jab
at Establishing Credibility in Professional Boxing, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2280–81
(2000) (detailing legislative efforts to regulate boxing since 1960 and reasons for
17
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ers, such as Don King and Bob Arum, who were at risk of being
adversely affected, opposed the passage of the Ali Act.111  Despite
opposition from powerful adversaries, the Ali Act ultimately passed
in 2000, and represented a dramatic step forward to protect the
interests of boxers, encourage fair competition, and improve the
overall integrity of the sport.112  Key provisions in the bill include a
limitation on coercive contracts, an objective rankings criteria, and
financial disclosure requirements for promoters and sanctioning
organizations.113
Since its passage, some argue that the Ali Act has not gone far
enough to regulate and reform professional boxing, which is a still
fraught with allegations of misconduct amongst its array of world
sanctioning organizations and promoters.114  Even if the Ali Act has
fallen short in solving all of professional boxing’s ailments, it has
been effective in protecting the economic interests of the fight-
ers.115  As a result of the Ali Act’s successes, there have been proac-
tive efforts to expand its reach to MMA.116  In fact, Markwayne
Mullin, a politician and former mixed martial artist, introduced a
bill to Congress in May 2016 to do just that.117
passage of Ali Act).  The Ali Act was really just an addition to the Professional
Boxers Safety Act (“PBSA”) of 1996, which “takes the regulation of boxing a step
further by protecting boxers outside of the ring from exploitation through unethi-
cal business practices.” Id. at 2281.
111. See id. (explaining that Senator “Harry Reid of Nevada, who ha[d] previ-
ously stated that boxing’s most powerful promoters, Don King and Bob Arum,
[were] his most important constituents” blocked final draft of Ali Act before its
ultimate passage).
112. See McCain & Nahigian, supra note 39, at 21 (describing benefits and R
aims of Ali Act).
113. See id. (describing most important aspects of Ali Act). See generally 15
U.S.C. § 6307(a)–(f).
114. See, e.g., id. at 22 (explaining problems that persist despite passage of Ali
Act and PBSA).
115. See Cristina Groschel, Comment, Down for the Count: The Muhammad Ali
Boxing Reform Act and Its Shortcomings, 26 NOVA L. REV. 927, 940 (2002) (detailing
strengths of Ali Act).
116. See Brett Okamoto, Ali Act Amendment Could Expand Federal Law’s Coverage
to MMA, ESPN (May 19, 2016), http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/
15589773/bill-aims-expand-muhammad-ali-boxing-reform-act-mma [https://per
ma.cc/4JBU-J7KH] (discussing efforts to expand Ali Act to MMA).
117. See id. (discussing efforts to expand Ali Act to MMA).
Mullins’ H.R 5365 “died” when the 114th Congress ended in January
2017, as does any bill which is not made into law before the end of the
Congress in which it was submitted.  On January 3rd Mullins’ reintro-
duced the bill under the name H.R.44 in the 115h Congress, which runs
until January 3rd, 2019.  H.R. 44 has 11 co-sponsors (8 Republicans and 3
Democrats).
Tim Bissell, UFC Spent an Estimated $420,000 Lobbying the Ali Act in 2016, BLOODY
ELBOW (May 13, 2017), https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2017/3/13/14894754/ufc-
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D. Antitrust Litigation: Promoters Get the Fight Taken to Them
In light of the incredible success of the UFC, one of the most
powerful men in boxing, Al Haymon, has attempted to imitate the
MMA business model (without running afoul of the Ali Act), which,
unsurprisingly, has led him into trouble in the boxing commu-
nity.118  Haymon founded the management company Haymon
Sports LLC in 2013, and he currently manages over 200 boxers,
including “Floyd Mayweather Jr., the world’s highest paid athlete in
2014 and 2015; Amir Khan; and current welterweight champions
Danny Garcia and Keith Thurman.”119  Haymon expanded his busi-
ness beyond just management services in 2015, when he created the
television series PBC, with the purpose of increasing the sport’s ex-
posure and bringing boxing back into the mainstream by airing
fights on primetime network television.120  PBC marked a signifi-
cant change in the boxing business model, and, according to
Haymon, “[t]he PBC was an attempt to bring boxing back to free
television, to reverse the long-term trend of declining interest in
the sport, and to improve the opportunities available to the fighters
and particularly, those that Haymon Sports managed or advised.”121
Haymon’s ultimate goal in creating PBC, was to turn it into a “ma-




118. See Bryan Graham, With Boxing’s Return to Prime-Time Network TV, Al
Haymon Makes His Move, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
sport/2015/mar/06/with-boxings-return-to-prime-time-network-tv-al-haymon-
makes-his-move [https://perma.cc/3VBU-TX6Y] (“[Premier Boxing Champions]
is the brainchild of Al Haymon, the reclusive Harvard-educated businessman
widely regarded as boxing’s most powerful figure . . . . Haymon’s designs for the
Premier Boxing Champions franchise are predicated on the absorption of upfront
risk for greater back-end gains.”).
119. Golden Boy Promotions, LLC v. Haymon, No. CV 15-3378-JFW, 2017 WL
460736, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2017) (describing factual history of case including
Haymon’s management of top fighters).
120. See Graham, supra note 118 (“Haymon, backed by private investors, has R
spent $20m to purchase airtime for 20 shows this year on NBC and NBC Sports
Network, an inversion of the traditional sports TV model where the network pays
for the rights to air an event.  He will recoup costs by pocketing revenue on adver-
tising during PBC shows–but also in building the profiles of the fighters he’s con-
tracted on a platform  with far greater reach than premium cable.”).
121. Golden Boy Promotions, 2017 WL 460736, at *3 (quoting defendant Al
Haymon).  “Ultimately, Haymon Sports successfully entered into exclusive agree-
ments with NBC, CBS, ESPN, Fox Sports 1, and SpikeTV.” Id. at *4.
122. Id. at *3 (detailing goals for PBC).  “Waddell & Reed, a private equity
firm, invested $585 million into the PBC venture.” Id.
19
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In 2015, Golden Boy Promotions (the majority of which is
owned by retired boxer Oscar De La Hoya) and part-owner Bernard
Hopkins filed a $300 million lawsuit against Haymon and his com-
panies, alleging that they were attempting to monopolize profes-
sional boxing in violation of both the Ali Act and Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act.123  Top Rank Promotions filed a very similar
lawsuit against Haymon a few months later seeking $100 million in
damages, but that case settled within the same year.124
On January 26, 2017, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted Haymon’s motion for sum-
mary judgment.125  The court first held that the plaintiffs lacked
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Haymon violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act.126  In particular, the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate that Haymon made his boxing management services contin-
gent on whether fighters rejected competitors’ boxing promotion
services (known as an illegal “tying arrangement”).127  In addition,
the plaintiffs could not establish that Haymon possessed sufficient
economic power in the relevant market to have engaged in tying
arrangements, or that there were significant barriers to market en-
try for new managers.128  To the contrary, the court, quoting the
plaintiffs’ expert witness, noted that boxing as a sport has “not natu-
rally evolved towards having a single entity controlling most or all of
the professionally televised events in the sport.”129
The court also rejected the claim that Haymon attempted mo-
nopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act because
123. See Figueroa, supra note 50, at 198 (discussing dispute amongst R
promoters).
124. See id. at 199 (discussing further dispute amongst promoters); see also
Dan Rafael, Top Rank’s Bob Arum Settles Lawsuit with PBC Creator Al Haymon, ESPN
(May 20, 2016), http://www.espn.com/boxing/story/_/id/15618555/bob-arum-
top-rank-reaches-settlement-premier-boxing-champions-al-haymon-lawsuit [https:/
/perma.cc/BEN7-W2KU] (detailing Bob Arum’s settlement with Haymon).  As
part of the settlement agreement, Haymon waived his exclusivity agreements with
the Television networks he had contracted with. See Golden Boy Promotions, 2017
WL 460736, at *3.
125. See Golden Boy Promotions, 2017 WL 460736, at *1 (providing holding).
126. See id. at *8 (holding plaintiffs failed to prove violation of Section 1 of
Sherman Act).
127. See id. (“In contrast, six boxers . . . have submitted declarations that un-
equivocally state, ‘neither Mr. Alan Haymon, Haymon Sports, or anyone acting on
their behalf has ever pressured or coerced me to either (i) work with any particular
promoter (including Golden Boy), or (ii) not work with any particular promoter
(including Golden Boy).’”).
128. See id. at *12 (holding without properly defined market, it is impossible
to accurately determine defendants’ market share).
129. Id. at *13 (quoting plaintiffs’ expert witness Dr. Knueper’s report on the
evolution of boxing market).
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there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Haymon’s ex-
clusive television agreements were anticompetitive, or that Haymon
blocked a substantial share of venues from Golden Boy.130  Lastly,
plaintiffs alleged that Haymon violated the Ali Act, by acting as both
a manager and promoter, however, the court held that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing because the only parties with standing under
the Ali Act are boxers and government agencies, not promoters.131
On February 28, 2017, Golden Boy filed an appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.132  On October 25, 2017, however,
the parties requested that the Ninth Circuit dismiss the appeal with
prejudice, and it was dismissed.133  If the parties had not mutually
agreed to dismiss the appeal, the Ninth Circuit’s review of the dis-
trict court’s decision would have been able to shed light on a pend-
ing antitrust case against the UFC which has been filed in the same
circuit, Le.134  In 2014, “[e]lite professional MMA fighters”—includ-
ing former UFC fighters Cung Le, Nathan Quarry, and Jon Fitch—
filed an antitrust action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act against
the UFC’s former parent company, Zuffa LLC.135  The multi-mil-
lion-dollar lawsuit accuses the UFC of “illegally maintaining monop-
oly and monopsony power by systematically eliminating
competition from rival promoters, artificially suppressing fighters’
earnings from bouts and merchandising and marketing activities
through restrictive contracting and other exclusionary practices.”136
On October 16, 2016, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nevada denied Zuffa’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit.137
130. See id. at *15–*16 (“There are numerous alternative venues in most ma-
jor metropolitan areas of the United States.”).
131. See id. at *17–*18 (discussing parties with standing under Ali Act).
132. See Plaintiff’s Motion to Appeal, Golden Boy Promotions, LLC v.
Haymon, No. 17-55259 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2017), ECF No. 1 (filing appeal of District
Court’s grant of summary judgment to Haymon).
133. See Stipulation for Dismissal of Appeal, Golden Boy Promotions, No. 17-
55259 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2017), ECF No. 12.
134. For further discussion of Le v. Zuffa, LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Nev.
2016), see infra notes 135–140 and accompanying text. R
135. See Le, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (explaining background of case).
136. See Tristan Critchfield, Class-Action Lawsuit Filed Against UFC by Cung Le,
Jon Fitch, Nate Quarry, SHERDOG (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.sherdog.com/news/
news/ClassAction-Lawsuit-Filed-Against-UFC-by-Cung-Le-Jon-Fitch-Nate-Quarry-
78853#Ac8fPqKojEI8X4Ur.99 [https://perma.cc/D9AW-7U3D] (quoting plain-
tiffs’ complaint).  The court defined “monopsony power” as “market power on the
buy side of the market.  As such, a monopsony is to the buy side of the market what
a monopoly is to the sell side and is sometimes colloquially called a ‘buyer’s mo-
nopoly.’” Le, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1163 (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Ross–Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 320 (2007)).
137. See Le, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1160 (denying Zuffa’s motion to dismiss).
21
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In denying Zuffa’s motion, the court held that the plaintiffs
sufficiently pled a claim for actual monopolization in violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.138  Specifically, the court held the
plaintiffs sufficiently defined the relevant market when they re-
ferred to “Live Elite Professional MMA bouts,” and sufficiently al-
leged that this “elite” market is captured by the UFC.139  The court
also held that the plaintiffs sufficiently identified various potential
anticompetitive clauses in the UFC’s contract as well as acts that, as
a whole, could potentially constitute an anticompetitive scheme, in-
cluding the elimination of rivals and the restriction of “rivals’ access
to top quality venues, sponsors, endorsements, PPV and television
broadcast outlets.”140
III. ANALYSIS
A direct comparison of the two combat sports demonstrates
that professional boxing’s areas of weakness are the UFC’s areas of
strength and vice versa.141  Due to the multitude of promotions,
sanctioning bodies, and weight classes, professional boxing has
grown far too loose and incoherent, which has made it susceptible
to corruption, and contributed to its decline in popularity.142  In
contrast, the UFC used boxing as the blueprint of what not to do in
terms of MMA progression and became immensely popular as a re-
sult of its uniformity and brand recognition.143
However, despite its glaring structural problems, the economic
interests of fighters are better protected in professional boxing
than in MMA.144  This is because (1) the competition between pro-
fessional boxing promoters gives top fighters many career options,
unlike MMA fighters who continue to be exploited by the UFC due
to its systematic monopolization of the sport, and (2) the imple-
138. See id. at 1166 (holding plaintiffs sufficiently pled Section 2 claim).
139. Id. at 1165 (quoting plaintiffs’ complaint); see id. at 1166 (agreeing with
plaintiffs that market can be sufficiently defined).
140. Id. at 1168 (quoting plaintiffs’ complaint); see id. (holding just because
exclusive dealing arrangements themselves are legal does not mean UFC’s conduct
as a whole is legal).
141. See infra notes 148–229 and accompanying text (comparing and contrast- R
ing boxing’s weaknesses with UFC’s strengths and vice versa).
142. See infra notes 148–176 and accompanying text (discussing corruption R
between promoters and sanctioning bodies and boxing’s declining popularity).
143. See infra notes 177–182 and accompanying text (discussing UFC domi- R
nance and lack of corruption in MMA).
144. See infra notes 183–229 and accompanying text (discussing monopolistic R
practices of UFC and effects of Ali Act).
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mentation of the Ali Act has provided boxers with more legal pro-
tection than their MMA counterparts.145
Looking forward, the court’s holding in Golden Boy demon-
strates that professional boxing should cure its ailments by moving
in the direction of a league-like structure similar to the UFC, and,
as PBC has shown, this can be done without violating anti-trust law
or the Ali Act.146  In addition, a comparative analysis with the hold-
ing in Golden Boy will give insight to whether the Le court will hold
the UFC is indeed a monopoly in need of changing its business
practices and whether the court will also reinforce the argument
that MMA should be regulated under the Ali Act in order to pre-
vent fighter exploitation in the future.147
A. Business in Boxing Is Stiff Competition, but in MMA, the
UFC Is the Undisputed Champ
The structure of boxing is not very structured at all because
“those who control the championship belts for which professional
boxers compete, and those who control the boxers pursuant to pro-
motional agreements are those who control the sport . . . [which]
are [the multiple] world sanctioning organizations and promoters
respectively.”148  Broken down, all of the boxing industry’s issues
can be attributed to four things: sanctioning bodies, promoters, the
judging of fights, and the number of weight classes.149  With so
many competing interests, it is easy to see “how simple it could be
to corrupt the entire sport.”150
145. See infra notes 183–229 and accompanying text (discussing monopolistic R
practices of UFC and effects of Ali Act).
146. See infra notes 230–248 and accompanying text (discussing Golden Boy R
and its potential effects on future of PBC).
147. See infra notes 249–271 and accompanying text (comparing Le and R
Golden Boy and discussing effects of Ali Act in MMA).
148. See McCain & Nahigian, supra note 39, at 24 (discussing sanctioning or- R
ganizations and promoters).
149. See generally id.; Baglio, supra note 110 (discussing corruption of promot- R
ers); Groschel, supra note 115; Brian Campbell, Even After a Brilliant Canelo-GGG R
Fight, Focus is on Boxing’s Potential Corruption, CBS Sports (Aug. 17, 2017), https://
www.cbssports.com/boxing/news/even-after-a-brilliant-canelo-ggg-fight-focus-is-
on-boxings-potential-corruption/ [https://perma.cc/8CAM-USJ7]; Kevin McRae,
The Five Biggest Problems in Boxing, BLEACHERREPORT (Feb. 14, 2013), http://
bleacherreport.com/articles/1526079-ranking-the-5-biggest-problems-in-boxing
[https://perma.cc/Q36P-E936].  For further discussion of the issues concerning
the general framework of professional boxing, see infra notes 151–176. R
150. Groschel, supra note 115, at 936 (describing how easily boxing can be R
corrupted).  This problem is exactly what the Ali Act was intended to address. See
Baglio, supra note 110, at 2280 (addressing abuses in boxing industry). R
23
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At the core of the corruption, is the relationship between sanc-
tioning organizations and promoters.151  Sanctioning organizations
give official approval for “championship-level boxing matches, and
their primary role is to rank fighters.”152  Rankings dictate the over-
all value of a particular fighter to the industry, and when a boxer is
ranked in the top fifteen, he is eligible to fight for a champion-
ship.153  The most prominent sanctioning organizations are the
World Boxing Council, World Boxing Association, International
Boxing Federation, and World Boxing Union (“WBU”), and their
funding comes from fees imposed on boxers in exchange for the
opportunity to fight for their respective championship title.154
Each of these organizations effectively compete against one an-
other, and their ratings have been often criticized for ignoring
highly-rated boxers from rival sanctioning bodies in favor of their
own “champion.”155
Promoters, on the other hand, sign exclusive agreements with
boxers in order to market and essentially put on the match.156  The
promoter grants the boxer a purse amount for a bout, in exchange
for certain rights, such as “venue selection, sponsorship, ticket sales,
and broadcast rights.”157  The promoter is compensated via the rev-
enue from the bout, which is derived from the “live gate” (ticket
sales), the sale of television rights, and the sale of advertising
rights.158  Major boxing promoters in the United States and Canada
include “Top Rank, Golden Boy, Mayweather Promotions, Roc Na-
tion, Kathy Duva’s Main Event, Lou DiBella, Gary Shaw, Yvon
Michel, and Jean Bedard’s Interbox.”159  Because a promoter is
more interested in profiting than keeping boxers’ best interests in
mind, it is essential for boxers to have a manager who both negoti-
151. See McCain & Nahigian, supra note 39, at 24 (discussing sanctioning or- R
ganizations and promoters).  For further discussion of this problem, see infra notes
152–176 and accompanying text. R
152. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 39, at 24 (discussing sanctioning organi- R
zations and promoters).
153. See Groschel, supra note 115, at 938 (discussing criticism of sanctioning R
organizations).  “In the past, The Ring Magazine dictated the ratings.  When its
ratings became corrupted, however, sanctioning organizations took over.” Id.
154. See McCain & Nahigian, supra note 39, at 24 (discussing sanctioning or- R
ganizations and promoters).
155. See id. (discussing sanctioning organizations and promoters).
156. See id. at 25 (discussing role of promoters).
157. Id. (discussing relationship between promoters and boxers).
158. See Baglio, supra note 110, at 2261–62 (detailing how a promoter oper- R
ates and gets paid).
159. Nash, supra note 6. R
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ates contracts with the promoter and approves potential opponents
on behalf of the fighter.160
However, even if a boxer has a good manager, the various sanc-
tioning bodies and promotions operate with their own interests in
mind, leading to a persistent problem of sanctioning organizations
ranking boxers based on financial agreements with promoters
rather than their skill in the ring.161  For example, in 1999, three
top officials of the IBF were indicted for taking bribes from promot-
ers to manipulate the ratings system for the benefit of particular
boxers, a practice that boxing insiders labeled “common knowl-
edge.”162  This practice was partially remedied by the passage of the
Ali Act in 2000, however allegations of favoritism among sanction-
ing bodies are still widespread.163  A more recent example was in
2003, when a court ordered the WBC pay $30 million to boxer, Ger-
man Rocchigiani, whom it stripped of his light-heavyweight title in
order to give it to the more popular Roy Jones, Jr.164  In addition, in
2005, the WBC stripped Javier Castillejo of his super welterweight
title because he fought someone other than “Don King-promoted
Ricardo Mayorga despite the fact that Mayorga had never fought at
that weight.”165  Evidently, it has been repeatedly proven that the
relationship between corrupt sanctioning organizations and pro-
moters willing to pay them off is terrible for the sport of boxing and
a contributing factor in the sport’s demise.166
160. See Baglio, supra note 110, at 2261 (detailing manager’s responsibilities). R
161. See Groschel, supra note 115, at 938 (“[P]roblem[s] arise[ ] . . . often R
[when] ratings are for sale . . . . Just as often, however, promoters are buying.”).
162. See Baglio, supra note 110, at 2277 (describing IBF scandal of 1999). R
In addition to the receipt of direct payments, sanctioning organizations
also manipulate the ratings in order to increase the organizations profits.
Because sanctioning organizations are compensated by receiving a cer-
tain percentage of the two fighters’ purses, an incentive exists to rank
more highly popular boxers, who earn larger purses, so that the organiza-
tion is paid more money.
Id.
163. See Tyler Curtis, 47 Years of Rotten Boxing Decisions and the WBC Is Still
Going Strong, BLEACHERREPORT (Feb. 17, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/arti-
cles/346325-47-years-of-rotten-boxing-decisions-and-the-wbc-is-still-going-strong
[https://perma.cc/X4C4-Q2GG] (explaining scandals involving WBC).
164. See id. (explaining scandals involving WBC).
165. Id. (explaining scandals involving WBC).
166. See Baglio, supra note 110, at 2264 (explaining intricate relationship be- R
tween promoters, sanctioning bodies, and career success of boxers).
A boxer can achieve successful career only if all of these parties perform
their obligations.  Because this does not always occur, a boxer can be very
successful inside the ring, but have very little to show financially if the
manager has not vigorously negotiated his interests.  In addition, victories
can be meaningless if the promoter does not supply the boxer with fre-
quent bouts against respected competition.  Boxers are also at the mercy
25
Maschi: Million Dollar Babies Do Not Want To Share: An Analysis of Antitr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS206.txt unknown Seq: 26 26-JUN-18 12:26
434 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25: p. 409
It is clear that promoters are the nexus of the problem because
in addition to corrupting sanctioning bodies, promoters are also
responsible for paying boxing judges, which gives them undue in-
fluence despite the fact that judges are selected or approved by the
state athletic commission.167  Very often, fighters with the potential
to make the promoters the most money tend to get preferential
treatment on the judges’ scorecards.168  This was exemplified in the
recent bout between Gennady Golovkin (known by his moniker,
“Triple G”) and Saul “Canelo” Alvarez on August 16, 2017, when
the judges scored the fight a draw despite most believing that
Golovkin was the clear winner.169  After the fight, many in the box-
ing community blamed behind-the-scenes corruption as the reason
for the controversial decision.170  Bad scorecards such as this have
come to be expected in boxing, “[y]et the judges who become most
known for the wrong reasons seem to consistently get chosen for
the biggest assignments, time and again.”171
The questionable relationships that promoters have with sanc-
tioning bodies and judges have undoubtedly disheartened even the
most avid boxing fans, and, as a result, contributed to professional
boxing’s decline in popularity.172  However, the sanctioning bodies
themselves are just as responsible as the promoters for boxing’s fad-
ing appeal because over the years they have created far too many
of sanctioning organizations because, without their recognition of a
boxer as a top contender, the boxer may never get an opportunity to
fight for a championship.
Id.
167. See id. at 2263–64 (describing process of selecting judges).
168. See Campbell, supra note 149 (describing controversial result of Golovkin R
vs. Alvarez).
169. See id. (discussing fears that Alvarez would be treated favorably because
bout was promoted by Golden Boy).
The fact that referencing Alvarez’s preferential treatment was a necessary
and legitimate part of the pre-fight narrative should have been more
troubling than perceived.  And the fact that questionable decisions—
that’s being kind—continue to pop up in Las Vegas far more than any
other city, helping the fight capital of the world live up to its Wild West
reputation, has become nothing short of a tired act.
Id.
170. See id. (describing controversial result of Golovkin vs. Alvarez).
171. Id. (explaining problems with corruption in boxing continue to persist).
172. See generally Andrew McGregor, Looking Back on Boxing in 2017, SPORT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (Dec. 29, 2017), https://ussporthistory.com/2017/12/29/
%EF%BB%BFlooking-back-on-boxing-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/TH7N-
MGUN] (“[S]ince the sport relies on the rare fighter that appeals to more than
just the small but loyal boxing crowd, there’s an inherent conflict of interest when
the entire sport’s well-being is dependent on a few athletes.  No one benefits if the
sport’s top, young attraction losses.”).
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weight classes, which makes the sport difficult to follow.173  In the
1950s, there were only nine weight classes, each with one cham-
pion, but today “there are [seventeen] separate divisions and the
potential for over 100 different men to wear world championship
belts of varying standing and worth.”174  In addition, several sanc-
tioning bodies distinguish champions and “super-champions”
within the same weight class, which further diminishes the impor-
tance of the title.175  The amount of weight classes and champions
multiplied by the number of sanctioning bodies issuing belts has
caused boxing titles to become extremely trivialized.176
In MMA, the UFC is the most dominant promoter in the sport,
and, in addition to that role, it is also the matchmaker and the sanc-
tioning body, which allows it to issue its own belts.177  As a result of
its strong centralized power, the UFC has seen relatively few
problems with corruption in the way boxing has throughout its en-
tire history.178  In addition, the UFC has an advantage over profes-
sional boxing because it crowns only one undisputed champion in
each of its ten weight classes.179  This makes it easy for fans to know
who the best fighters are, which is good because “at the core of all
173. See generally Paul Gibson, Boxing Loses Credibility with Every New Champion.
Can the Sport be Saved?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2015, 5:15 PM), https://www.theguar-
dian.com/sport/the-balls-of-wrath/2015/feb/02/transnational-boxing-rankings-
board-sport-titles [https://perma.cc/T6DE-REX5] (discussing boxing’s decline in
credibility).
174. Id. (discussing confusing amount of “champions” in professional
boxing).
175. See McRae, supra note 149 (“Super champions . . . have held the belts for R
a lengthy period of time.  That creates a situation, such as exists in the heavyweight
division and many others, where two fighters technically hold the same belt from
the same sanctioning body.”).
176. See id. (explaining trivialization of champions in boxing).
177. See Nash, supra note 6 (explaining UFC plays). R
178. See Aaron Kellerstrass, 5 Reasons MMA Is Better than Boxing, BLEACHER RE-
PORT (Oct. 19, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/899987-5-reasons-mma-
is-better-than-boxing (explaining that compared to boxing, MMA isn’t corrupt).
But see Greg Howard, The Future of the UFC is Here, DEADSPIN (Dec. 10, 2015), https:/
/deadspin.com/the-future-of-the-ufc-is-here-1746984570 [https://perma.cc/
NH6X-AZM2].
The UFC controls the media by investing in publications outright or else
denying access to those who would cover its flaws in an effort to hamper
critical outlets from doing so while dissuading others from starting.  The
UFC has done sinister things like allowing fighters whose drug tests throw
up red flags to compete, so long as they can generate lots of money for
the organization.  All of this does a lot to allow the promotion to control
the sport, and even blur the distinction between the two.
Id. For further discussion of the history of the UFC, see supra notes 68–98 and R
accompanying text.
179. See Alapi, supra note 13 (contrasting weight classes in the UFC with R
weight classes in boxing).
27
Maschi: Million Dollar Babies Do Not Want To Share: An Analysis of Antitr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\25-2\VLS206.txt unknown Seq: 28 26-JUN-18 12:26
436 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25: p. 409
sports is the desire to know who is the best, who is the champion,
and, of course, there should be only one.”180  With few exceptions,
the “world champion” of each weight class in MMA is the UFC
champion.181  There are of course, other promotions, such as Bel-
lator, and World Series of Fighting, but they pale in comparison to
the UFC’s industry clout, respect, and dominance.182
B. Economic Interest of Fighters
1. Boxers Have Options, but UFC Monopoly Makes Contract
Negotiations an Unfair Fight
Despite the corruption and the confusing way in which profes-
sional boxing operates, there are also benefits which arise from the
competing interests because, as boxing promoter Gary Shaw put it,
“[i]f [a promoter] do[esn’t] want you, you go to Arum, or you go to
K2 or you got to Golden Boy.  You go somewhere else . . . . [But]
[i]f you are the only gas station in town you can charge whatever
you want.”183  The UFC’s unbridled power in the MMA world has
truly made it “the only gas station in town,” which, in other words,
means it has monopolized the sport of MMA, in violation of the
Sherman Act.184  This monopoly has provided the company with
“enormous bargaining power, unmatched by any fighter regardless
of success or status.”185  The UFC has in fact become “so prominent
that its name is almost synonymous with the wider sport of
MMA.”186
180. Gibson, supra note 173 (explaining importance of undisputed R
champions).
181. See Nash, supra note 6 (“[A]ccording to the Fight Matrix rankings, every R
male fighter in the top three of their division and roughly 85% of all top 10 fight-
ers in the ten divisions that the UFC promotes are under contract with the UFC.”).
In addition, there are far fewer weight classes in the UFC as opposed to boxing.
See Fighter Listing, UFC, http://www.ufc.com/fighter/Weight_Class?id= [https://
perma.cc/J7TM-XCBY] (last visited Sept. 18, 2017).  The UFC has eleven total
weight classes, with only one champion in each, while boxing currently has seven-
teen separate divisions. See id.  For further discussion of weight classes in boxing,
see supra note 12 and accompanying text. R
182. See Nash, supra note 6 (“While competitors like World Series of Fighting R
and Bellator do exist, the competition they offer seems very limited.  Estimates for
the WSOF and Bellator’s combined yearly revenue is roughly 1/20th that of the
UFC.”).
183. Id. (quoting interview with boxing promoter, Gary Shaw).
184. Id. (quoting interview with Gary Shaw).  For further discussion of the
UFC’s monopoly, see infra notes 249–271 and accompanying text. R
185. Same, supra note 67, at 1064–65 (describing coercive nature of contracts R
in UFC).
186. Bull, supra note 11 (explaining UFC brand strength). R
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A 2007 Deutsche Bank Memorandum detailed how the UFC’s
brand strength impacted its negotiations with fighters:
[T]he UFC brand is more recognizable than the sum of its
individual fighters, as evidenced by its ability to nearly sell
out venues even before the announcing the main card to
the public. As such, given the power of the brand, fighters
are relatively interchangeable at events without affecting
the market demand. When no individual fighter can dra-
matically affect the economics of the event, the UFC be-
lieves that it retains the leverage to contain costs when
needed.187
This type of name recognition is virtually non-existent in box-
ing, where the fighters are much more familiar to the average fan
than the promotion they fight under.188  As a result of its power,
the UFC drafts its contracts with an exclusivity provision that heavily
favors itself.189  The UFC restricts the fighter’s contract to a speci-
fied number of fights, but also includes various termination and
extension clauses that can be triggered at the UFC’s discretion.190
As a result of these coercive clauses, the UFC has the power to com-
pletely control the fighters.191  These clauses include the “cham-
pion’s clause,” which enables the UFC to extend the contract at will
if the fighter becomes a champion while under the original con-
tract.192  In addition, the “retirement clause” allows the UFC “to re-
187. Nash, supra note 6 (quoting Deutsche Bank Memorandum).  The UFC’s R
brand strength has only grown stronger since 2007.  For further discussion of UFC
brand strength, see supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. R
188. See Nash, supra note 6 (explaining power of UFC brand). R
189. See Same, supra note 67, at 1065–67 (discussing coercive UFC contract R
clauses).
190. See id. (discussing coercive UFC contract clauses).
The exclusivity provision binds the fighter to a restricted relationship
with the UFC for an agreed upon term and specified number of fights.
Regardless of the term length in the agreement, the provision includes
various termination and extension clauses that can be triggered at the
promoter’s discretion.  One of the most controversial extension clauses is
the ‘champion’s clause,’ which allows the promoter to extend the con-
tract if the fighter wins a championship belt during the original term.
The ‘retirement clause’ is often invoked only for top fighters seeking re-
tirement, and it gives the UFC power to ‘retain the rights to retired fight-
ers in perpetuity.’  Finally, the ‘ancillary rights agreement’ itself is not an
extension provision, but rather a lifetime agreement that requires the
fighter to sign over rights to his name, sobriquet, voice, persona, signa-
ture, likeness, and/or biography.
Id.
191. See id. (citing key provisions from UFC exclusive fighter agreement).
192. See id. at 1066 (citing key provisions from UFC exclusive fighter
agreement).
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tain the rights to a retired fighter it perpetuity.”193  Last, the
“ancillary rights agreement” is a lifetime agreement which requires
the fighters to forfeit their right of publicity.194
The restrictive nature of the UFC’s contract provisions have led
to disputes with some of the promotions biggest stars, such as An-
derson Silva, Randy Couture, and Georges St-Pierre, among
others.195  During his dominant reign as middleweight champion in
the UFC, Anderson Silva wanted to vacate his belt and move to a
new weight class in order to escape the champion’s clause, which
would have automatically extended his contract at the end of his
agreed-upon term and, therefore, preventing him from competing
against Roy Jones, Jr. in a highly lucrative boxing match.196  In
2007, UFC Hall of Fame member Randy Couture resigned from the
UFC due to a contract dispute and, after a costly legal battle, re-
turned when the UFC restructured his deal.197  Couture stated in a
recent interview, “I’m an example of somebody that they’ve tried to
black out, and that’s because of my stance with them almost from
the very start over ancillary rights and the language in the contracts
that they were trying to make me sign.”198  Most recently, in 2016,
former welter weight champion, Georges St-Pierre, terminated his
UFC contract following repeatedly failed negotiations to reach a
new deal, after which his lawyer stated “[t]hey’re basically tying him
up for life.  They have no rights and they own all of his licensing
and all the other things.  It’s unheard of in the other professional
sports.  And they won’t get away with it forever.”199
193. See id. (quoting Adam Swift, Inside the Standard Zuffa Contract, SHERDOG
(Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.sherdog.com/news/articles/Inside-the-Standard-
Zuffa-Contract-9734 [https://perma.cc/XZ2F-CR8M]).
194. See id. at 1066–67 (citing key provisions from UFC exclusive fighter
agreement).
195. See id. at 1068 (describing contractual issues which arose between UFC its
fighters in past).
196. See id. (describing reason why Anderson Silva wanted to vacate his belt).
197. See id. at 1068–69 (describing UFC contract disputes). See also Jon Fuen-
tes, Randy Couture Cautions GSP Against Long Legal Battle with UFC, LOWKICK MMA
(Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.lowkickmma.com/UFC/randy-couture-warns-gsp-
about-legal-battle-with-ufc/ [https://perma.cc/9CD5-G3YZ] (describing Couture’s
contract dispute with UFC).
198. Fuentes, supra note 197 (quoting interview with Randy Couture). R
199. Shaun Al-Shatti, Georges St-Pierre’s Lawyer Calls UFC Contract ‘Something Out
of the 1940s,’ Cautions UFC ‘Won’t Get Away with it Forever’, MMA FIGHTING (Oct. 19,
2016), https://www.mmafighting.com/2016/10/19/13333778/georges-st-pierres-
lawyer-calls-ufc-contract-something-out-of-the [https://perma.cc/9JE6-VD9U]
(quoting St-Pierre’s attorney, James Quinn, of New York firm Weil, Gotshal, and
Manges).
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In addition to the restrictive contract provisions remains the
looming issue of inadequate fighter pay because, while the top
draws, such as Silva and St-Pierre, certainly earn in the millions,
entry level fighters earn as little as $6,000.200  The UFC’s compensa-
tion system is essentially the inverse of professional boxing’s be-
cause, on average, the UFC pays its fighters 10% of the revenue
from an event, while it keeps 90%.201  In contrast, boxers make on
average 70% of the total revenue from an event, and 30% goes to
the promoter.202
All of these characteristics of the UFC support the conclusion
that it is a monopoly in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.203  The UFC has virtually destroyed its competition in the sport
of MMA, and it has done so through its coercive contract provisions
which constitute predatory and anticompetitive conduct.204  As a re-
sult, the UFC has achieved a dangerous probability of achieving
“monopoly power,” which has resulted in antitrust injury to the
fighters in the form of low compensation and the forfeiture of
other rights.205
200. See John Barr & Josh Gross, UFC Fighters Say Low Pay Simply Brutal, ESPN
(Jan. 15, 2012), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/page/UFCpay/ufc-fight-
ers-say-low-pay-most-painful-hit-all [https://perma.cc/HW46-KAR6] (detailing pay
discrepancies within UFC).
201. See id. (discussing UFC fighters’ compensation).
202. See id. (quoting Lou DiBella’s interview on boxing compensation versus
MMA compensation).
On average, [it is] estimated the UFC pays fighters roughly 10 percent of
the revenue generated from its live events, essentially the inverse of the
boxing business model.  ‘I think they have a tremendous business para-
digm,’ said Lou DiBella, a New York-based boxing promoter who spent
more than a decade as a programming executive running the boxing divi-
sion of HBO Sports.  The percentage of event-generated revenue that
goes to a boxer could be as high as 85 percent, DiBella said.  ‘A 70/30
deal is completely common,’ DiBella said, meaning 70 percent of the rev-
enue generated from the fight goes to the boxer, the remaining 30 per-
cent to the promoter.
Id.  In response to this comparison, Zuffa CEO Lorenzo Fertitta noted it is “like
apples and oranges” because, under the UFC business model, the UFC is every-
thing from the promoter to the television producer, and it, therefore, costs mil-
lions of dollars to produce just one event. Id.
203. For further discussion of the elements needed to establish a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
204. See Same, supra note 67, at 1065–67. For a discussion of the UFC’s coer- R
cive contract provisions, see supra notes 190–199 and accompanying text. R
205. For further discussion of the elements needed to establish a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.  For R
further discussion of the UFC’s inadequate compensation scheme, see supra notes
200–202 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the UFC’s monopoly, R
see infra notes 249–271 and accompanying text. R
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2. The Ali Act’s Impact: The UFC Must “Protect Itself at All Times”
In comparing the amount fighters are paid in the UFC to the
amount they are paid in professional boxing, it is necessary to take
into consideration not just competition amongst promoters (or lack
thereof) but also federal legislation.206  Under the Ali Act, “promot-
ers are required to disclose to boxers how much money their fights
generate.  No such law applies to the sport of mixed martial arts.”207
The Ali Act was designed to “regulate boxing because boxing can’t
regulate itself,” and in doing so it’s purpose was to protect boxers
from (1) coercive contracts, (2) sanctioning bodies, and (3)
promoters.208
The Ali Act imposes a one-year limit on promotional contracts
that are signed by a boxer as a condition to compete in a particular
bout that a promoter is putting on, and it prohibits any entity in
boxing from forcing a number one ranked challenger to give up
promotional rights or otherwise be denied the mandatory bout.209
In addition, sanctioning bodies are required to develop and follow
objective rankings guidelines for fighters.210  Promoters are re-
quired to disclose to the supervising state commission, a copy of
their contracts with the boxer, all fees and charges imposed on the
boxer, all payments made, and any reduction in the purse promised
to the boxer.211  In addition, promoters may not have a conflict of
interest with the management of a boxer.212  Among other things,
the passage of the Ali Act cut down on vague and coercive contracts
that enabled promoters to control boxers for their entire careers,
reformed the ranking system of the sanctioning bodies, and re-
duced anti-competitive restraints of trade while simultaneously in-
206. See Barr & Gross, supra note 200 (addressing effect of Ali Act on pay scale R
in boxing).
207. Id. Referring to the contrast between UFC and boxing, Lou DiBella, a
boxing promoter who contributed to the Ali Act legislation, stated, “[y]ou have
one industry that’s not disclosing and thriving, and another industry that is disclos-
ing and dying.” Id.
208. Groschel, supra note 115, at 939 (quoting Symposium: Boxing at the Cross- R
roads, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 193, 214 (2001)) (statement of Lou DiBella). See
Kim, supra note 69, at 60 (discussing three primary safeguards of Ali Act). R
209. See 15 U.S.C. § 6307(b) (2012) (detailing regulations on professional
boxing).
210. See id. (detailing Ali Act requirements).
211. See id. (detailing regulations on professional boxing).  Promoters are also
required to disclose to the boxer all revenues from the event, and judges and refer-
ees must also disclose payments received. See id.
212. See id. (detailing regulations on professional boxing).
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creasing free market bidding by promoters competing for the best
boxers.213
The major problems that fighters experience when dealing
with the UFC could clearly be remedied by the extension of the Ali
Act to MMA.214  After all, the Ali Act was passed in order to protect
fighters, and, due to the power of the UFC, its fighters need protec-
tion.215  First, the Ali Act’s extension to MMA would force the UFC
to alter their coercive exclusivity provision and the clauses that keep
certain fighters under contract in perpetuity, subject to the pro-
moter’s discretion.216  The extension of the Ali Act would also allow
fighters to seek contracts with other promoters after their contract
with the UFC expires, essentially resulting in fighters being treated
like the independent contractors they are, rather than employees
subject to the will of their employer.217  As mentioned earlier, simi-
lar coercive contract clauses were prevalent in boxing before the
passage of the Ali Act, such as those used by promoter Don King,
who “was known for having a challenger sign an agreement for him
to promote them if they won a belt from one of his fighters, even
213. See Melissa Bell, Time to Give Boxers a Fighting Chance: The Muhammad Ali
Boxing Reform Act, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L., 473, 491–93 (2000) (discussing
benefits of Ali Act).
214. For further discussion of the Ali Act, see supra notes 108–117 and accom- R
panying text.
215. See Raimondi, supra note 98 (“The UFC has done a phenomenal job at R
promoting the sport . . . [t]hey’ve done a horrible job at taking care of the fighters,
though.”) (quoting U.S. Representative, Markwayne Mullin).
216. See Geoff Varney, Comment, Fighting for Respect: MMA’s Struggle for Accept-
ance and How the Muhammad Ali Act Would Give it a Fighting Chance, 112 W. VA. L.
REV. 269, 295–303 (2009) (discussing the Ali Act’s applicability to MMA and detail-
ing transition process).
217. See Josh Gross, How the Ali Act Could Upset the Power Balance Between UFC
and Its Stars, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/
2016/may/02/ufc-muhammad-ali-act-mma-conor-mcgregor-dispute [https://per
ma.cc/9ZYQ-JVPU] (discussing how UFC operates more like league than
promoter).
[B]y limiting endorsement opportunities and securing fighters to long-
term contracts that include extension options, they appear to be operat-
ing like a league instead of merely a fight promoter.  Employment status
affects many issues such as benefits, tax implications, and liability.  In
team sports, athletes are generally defined as employees.  In individual
sports, like boxing, they’re paid as independent contractors.  The UFC-
fighter arrangement is a unique concoction of contractor and employee.
Among the key distinctions: employees work regularly with one company
while contractors can provide services for various entities.  UFC contracts
address this via exclusivity clauses that lock in fighters to the promotion.
The UFC provides a form of health insurance outside of competition, a
rarity for contractors, yet fighters are expected to cover their own ex-
penses for training among other costs.
Id.
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though the challenger already had his own promoters.”218  Under
the Ali Act, coercive provisions of this nature, which keep fighters
under contract for unspecified or undesired periods of time, are
prohibited.219
Second, in regards to rankings, the UFC currently uses its own
ranking system which only ranks fighters within the promotion, and
it does not refer to the rankings to determine championship
fights.220  The Ali Act requires championship belts and rankings to
be controlled by a third-party sanctioning body.221  Some view the
UFC’s in-house system as a better alternative to the system in box-
ing because championships in boxing have been watered down by
the number of sanctioning bodies and belts.222  However, the UFC’s
ability to award its own belts and dictate who gets a title shot may
result in the most lucrative matchups, but it does so at the expense
of fighters who are seen as more deserving.223  The Ali Act would
ensure that an objective criteria exists for ranking fighters and that
218. Varney, supra note 216, at 290 (addressing protection from coercive con- R
tracts).  When Evander Holyfield was set to fight WBA heavyweight champion Mike
Tyson in 1996, he was forced to sign a contract of this nature with Don King. Id.
Under the Ali act, the coercive provision, such as the one Holyfield signed, would
be limited to one year, or if he was a mandatory challenger to the belt recognized
by the WBA, he would not have had to sign a contract of this nature all. Id.
219. See id. at 289–90 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6307(b) (2012)). See also id. at
295–302 (discussing Ali Act’s applicability to MMA).  “Mark Cuban, owner of
HDNet Fights, has stated of UFC contracts, ‘[T]heir contracts don’t adhere to the
[Muhammad] Ali [Boxing] Reform Act.  There will come a time in the not distant
future, when they will be required to.’” Id. at 295.
For an example of one of these one-sided contracts, look to the contract
the UFC proposed Fedor Emelianenko, an MMA fighter who many con-
sider[ed] to be the best in the sport.  Emelianenko said the contract he
was offered was very limiting: “Basically I can’t leave undefeated.  I can’t
give interviews, appear in films or advertising. I don’t have the right to do
anything without the UFC’s agreement . . . [.]  There were many such
clauses; the contract was [eighteen] pages on length.  It was written in
such a way that I had absolutely no rights while the UFC could at any
moment, if something didn’t suit them, tear up the agreement.  We
worked with lawyers who told us that it was patently impossible to sign
such a document.
Id. at 299–300 (quoting Fedor Emelianenko).
220. See Raimondi, supra note 98 (discussing rankings in UFC). R
221. See id. (“If the Muhammad Ali Expansion Act is passed, that responsibil-
ity would fall first on the Association of Boxing Commissions (ABC).”).
222. See Okamoto, supra note 117 (discussing pros and cons of independent R
sanctioning bodies).
223. Id. (“‘When you’re talking about a rankings system, that ranking system
should mean something ....’ ‘If you’re ranked No. 1 and you have another fighter
ranked No. 2, the next title shot should go to No. 2.  It shouldn’t go to No. 5 ....
Rankings should be independent and they should be something title fights abide
by.’”) (quoting U.S. Representative Markwayne Mullin).
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the top ranked fighters are the ones who get the chance to fight for
the belt rather than the fighters who are the most popular.224
Third, UFC fighters do not have access to financial informa-
tion concerning their bout, and, as a result, they are prevented
from negotiating on a level playing field, just as boxers were before
the passage of the Ali Act.225  If the UFC was forced to disclose their
finances, the fighters could negotiate a larger split of the purse,
similar to boxing.226  It is no surprise that the UFC is extremely
opposed to the Ali Act extending to MMA and spent approximately
$420,000 in 2016 on lobbying efforts.227  In contrast, other MMA
promoters have voiced support for extending the Ali Act to their
sport, including Bellator president, Scott Coker, who said, “I think
it’s a pretty good idea, but like many good ideas, getting it from an
idea to actuality will be a long process—it’s not going to happen
overnight.”228  Without a doubt, expanding the Ali Act to MMA
224. See Raimondi, supra note 98 (“Just because they’re great at self-promot- R
ing and they’re great for ticket sales doesn’t mean that they can jump from ranked
fifth to all of a sudden having a title fight and No. 2 and No. 3 and No. 4 gets
passed over.  And we see that over and over and over again.”) (quoting U.S. Repre-
sentative Markwayne Mullin).
225. See Okamoto, supra note 117 (discussing effects of Muhammad Ali Ex- R
pansion Act); see also Ali Act Amendment Could Expand Federal Law’s Coverage to MMA,
ESPN (May 19, 2016) http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/15589773/bill-
aims-expand-muhammad-ali-boxing-reform-act-mma [https://perma.cc/LT9U-
X469] (quoting Arizona attorney Rob Maysey, “[t]he main benefit of this would be
promoters have to disclose revenue to the athletes made from their bouts . . . . My
experience has been that very few actually have these rights and with the UFC, I’ve
been told managers who have actually exercised those rights would never do it
again because there have been repercussions” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
226. See Russell Ess, Ben Askren on ‘Ali Act’ to MMA: Promoters Could Bid on Title
Fights Between No. 1 UFC and No. 2 Bellator Fighter, BJPENN (Jan. 27, 2017), http://
www.bjpenn.com/mma-news/ben-askren/ben-askren-on-ali-act-to-mma-promoters-
could-bid-on-title-fights-between-no-1-ufc-and-no-2-in-bellator-fighter/ [https://
perma.cc/LR9Q-2GXS] (citing MMA fighter Ben Askren).
It’s exactly what you saw with Mayweather and Pacquiao who made
$350m for one fight–if you accounted the total earnings for every mixed
martial artist in the history of MMA, I don’t know that would equal
$350m and they did it in one fight.  It makes a lot of sense for us.
Id. (quoting Ben Askren).
227. Tim Bissell, supra note 117 (addressing UFC lobbying efforts). R
228. See John Nash, Coker on Expanding the Ali Act to MMA: ‘I Think It’s a Pretty
Good Idea’, BLOODY ELBOW (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2015/
8/11/9125603/ufc-mma-bellator-scott-coker-interview-ali-act [https://perma.cc/
VCU4-LMTD] (quoting Scott Coker).  If the Ali Act were to be applied to MMA, it
is possible that independent rankings could create automatic title shots, which
would open up cross-promotional fights. See Ess, supra note 226.  For example, “if R
there is a No. 1 in the UFC and a No. 2 in Bellator, those two could fight and that
fight could be bid on by both the UFC and by Bellator and anyone else that would
want to bid on it for that matter.” Id. (quoting MMA fighter Ben Askren).  Big
name athletes in professional boxing and in MMA have also advocated for the Ali
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would be a good thing because, above all else, it would enable fight-
ers to negotiate fair contracts on a level playing field with the pow-
erful UFC.229
C. Antitrust Litigation Provides a Blueprint for the
Improvement of the Sports
1. Premier Boxing Champions Defeats Golden Boy Promotions in a
Unanimous Decision
Boxing has been in desperate need of uniformity for de-
cades.230  The court’s holding in Golden Boy demonstrates that PBC
is capable of bringing such uniformity to boxing without running
afoul of antitrust law.231  PBC was created by Haymon Sports Man-
agement with hopes of turning it into a “major sports property”
with a league like structure similar to the UFC that is owned by
Haymon Sports.232  PBC is not a traditional boxing promotion, but
rather a television series much more akin to a media conglomerate
like the UFC, which “orchestrates just about everything around a
fight card, including producing the events.”233
The fact that PBC is owned by a boxing management company
does not automatically mean that antitrust laws or the Ali Act is
being violated.234  The court’s holding in Golden Boy supports this
because there was no evidence of an unlawful tie out arrangement
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.235  In fact, there was
Act to be expanded to MMA, such as boxer Paulie Malignaggi. See Milan Ordon˜ez,
Malignaggi: There’s No Ali Act in MMA Because of Dana White, BLOODY ELBOW (Aug.
17, 2017), https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2017/8/17/16160458/floyd-mayweath
er-vs-conor-mcgregor-paulie-malignaggi-dana-white-ali-act-boxing-mma-news
[https://perma.cc/H6GA-Q82X] (“‘I never liked the guy.  I don’t think he treats
the fighters fairly,’ Malignaggi told Ariel Helwani.  ‘I don’t think he treats the UFC
fighters fairly.  There’s no Ali Act in MMA because of him mainly, first and fore-
most.  He’s one of the guys trying to prevent it from happening.’”) (quoting
Malignaggi).
229. See supra notes 206–228 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Ali R
Act if extended to MMA).
230. For further discussion of boxing’s history, see supra notes 37–66 and ac- R
companying text.
231. See generally Golden Boy Promotions, LLC v. Haymon, No. CV 15-3378-
JFW, 2017 WL 460736 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2017) (holding Al Haymon’s PBC did not
violate Sherman Act).
232. Id. at *3 (quoting Al Haymon).
233. Raimondi, supra note 98 (discussing differences between UFC and tradi- R
tional boxing promoters).
234. See generally Golden Boy Promotions, 2017 WL 460736 (holding Al
Haymon’s PBC did not violate Sherman Act).
235. See id. at *8 (holding there was insufficient evidence of unlawful tying
arrangement).
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no testimony from a single boxer stating that he had been coerced
into working with a “sham” promoter Haymon favored over a “legit-
imate” promoter such as Golden Boy.236  In addition, there was in-
sufficient evidence that Haymon’s market share was even sufficient
to commit such an arrangement.237
By creating PBC, Haymon created something new that was
good for both the fighters and the sport, and it is clear from the
court’s holding that Haymon’s conduct did not come close to at-
tempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.238  PBC represents new competition to boxing’s traditional
promoters; however, the fact that PBC is a new type of competition
does not equate to anticompetitive practices.239  In fact, the court’s
holding showed that there was an absence of any perceivable an-
ticompetitive conduct on behalf of Haymon.240  In support of this,
the court held first that the exclusive television agreements signed
by Haymon with various cable networks were not per se anticompe-
titive because the plaintiffs still clearly had access to pay-per-view
outlets, such as HBO and Showtime, which were the most widely-
used and profitable channels for showcasing boxing.241  Second,
the court held no evidence was produced to show Haymon blocked
a substantial share of venues from Golden Boy.242  Third, the court
concluded there was insufficient evidence that Haymon committed
anticompetitive “predatory pricing” because the plaintiffs failed to
236. See id. (“In contrast, six boxers . . . have submitted declarations that un-
equivocally state, ‘neither Mr. Alan Haymon, Haymon Sports, or anyone acting on
their behalf has ever pressured or coerced me to either (i) work with any particular
promoter (including Golden Boy), or (ii) not work with any particular promoter
(including Golden Boy).’”).
237. See id. at *12 (“Without a properly defined market it is impossible to
accurately determine Defendant’s market share.”).
238. See generally id. at *14–*19 (holding insufficient evidence of monopoliza-
tion); The Big Question: Is Al Haymon Good or Bad for Boxing?, BOXING MONTHLY
(Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.boxingmonthly.com/the-big-question/big-question-al-
haymon-good-or-bad-for-boxing/ [https://perma.cc/KL7B-A568] (discussing posi-
tive impact PBC has on boxing).
239. See, e.g., Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1175
(9th Cir. 2016) (stating Sherman Act is aimed “not against conduct which is com-
petitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy com-
petition itself”).
240. See generally Golden Boy Promotions, 2017 WL 460736, at *15 (describing
lack of anticompetitive conduct by Haymon). See also id. at *8 (“[I]t is undisputed
that Haymon Sports has, on several occasions, permitted its boxers to be promoted
by Golden Boy and other so-called legitimate promoters.”).
241. See id. at *15 (describing alternative channels available).
242. See id. at *16 (“There are numerous alternative venues in most major
metropolitan areas of the United States, and specifically in Los Angeles, where
Plaintiffs contend that the Haymon Entities ‘locked up’ just one venue for a lim-
ited set of dates.”).
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demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability the defendant
would recoup his investment in PBC, and the evidence actually in-
dicated to the contrary, that Haymon’s “free tv” growth strategy had
not achieved the success he had hoped for.243
In creating PBC, Haymon also acted within the bounds of the
Ali Act—which forbids “a promoter to have direct or indirect finan-
cial interest in the management of a boxer”—because every PBC
event has a fully-licensed promoter affiliated with it.244  However,
the court declined to address the plaintiff’s allegation that Haymon
Sports is actually the true promoter for PBC because, as the court
explained, the Ali Act exists to protect fighters but not “to compen-
sate promoters for lost profits.”245  Despite Golden Boy’s fears, it
has yet to be seen whether PBC will be a long-term success, because
one organization is virtually incapable of controlling boxing in a
similar manner to the way the UFC controls MMA.246  However,
PBC is certainly a step in the right direction for the sport of boxing,
and Haymon can continue to build his brand and utilize his vast
stable of fighters to create exciting matchups in the way Dana White
has with the UFC.247  Whether or not PBC achieves long-term suc-
cess, it is still absolutely essential for professional boxing to work
towards unification and the elimination of most of the sanctioning
bodies that have watered down and corrupted the sport for
decades.248
2. Golden Boy Left Empty-Handed—But Le v. Zuffa Will Strike Gold
It is clear that unlike PBC, the UFC is a monopoly in violation
of the Sherman Act, which is what the plaintiffs in Le are arguing,
and there are some key factors from the court’s summary judgment
243. Id. at *17.  The court further explained that “[i]n order for a plaintiff to
establish ‘predatory pricing’ it must prove: (1) below cost pricing; and (2) ‘a rea-
sonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more
than the losses suffered.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1986)).  In addition, the court noted that “[w]ithout
the probability of recoupment, ‘predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices
in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced,’ eliminating a predatory pricing
claim.” Id. (quoting Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 224 (1993)).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 6308 (2012).  For further discussion of the Ali Act, see supra
notes 108–117 and accompanying text. R
245. Golden Boy Promotions, 2017 WL 460736, at *18.
246. See generally BOXING MONTHLY, supra note 238 (discussing positive impact R
PBC has on boxing).
247. See id. (discussing future of PBC).
248. For further discussion on corruption of sanctioning bodies, see supra
notes 148–171 and accompanying text. R
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decision in Golden Boy that may help predict how Le will turn out.249
In order to succeed on a claim of actual monopolization, the plain-
tiffs in Le must prove the defendant “(i) possessed monopoly power
in the relevant markets, (ii) willfully acquired or maintained its mo-
nopoly power through exclusionary conduct, and (iii) caused anti-
trust injury.”250
Both Golden Boy and Le required the plaintiffs at the outset to
use circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the defendants’ mo-
nopoly power by doing three things: “(1) defin[ing] the relevant
market, (2) show[ing] that the defendant owns a dominant share of
that market, and (3) show[ing] that there are significant barriers to
market entry and show[ing] that existing competitors lack the ca-
pacity to increase their output in the short run.”251  The plaintiffs in
Golden Boy made a critical error in failing to define the relevant
market, and if anything, they “grossly overestimated” Haymon’s
market share.252  The plaintiffs in Le, on the other hand, sufficiently
defined the relevant market as “Elite Professional MMA fighters,”
and therefore survived the motion to dismiss.253  Looking ahead,
there is a substantial amount of evidence distinguishing the market
of UFC fighters from the rest of the MMA world, including media
attention, widespread consensus that UFC fighters are seen as the
best, and most importantly, the fact that “the UFC has created the
exact championship league held to be the relevant market in other
sporting contexts.”254  In addition, unlike Haymon, it is clear the
UFC controls 90% of revenues from Elite Professional MMA bouts,
which the court found to be sufficient as a matter of law to support
the finding of market power.255  The fact that the PBC is still rela-
tively new and unknown, while the UFC is a household name and
249. See Paul Gift, Golden Boy Loses Antitrust Case Against Al Haymon in a Big
Way, BLOODY ELBOW (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.bloodyelbow.com/2017/1/27/
14411870/golden-boy-loses-haymon-pbc-antitrust-monoply-lawsuit-boxing-news
[https://perma.cc/WYY4-SGA3] (describing key takeaways from Golden Boy).
250. Le v. Zuffa, LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1161 (D. Nev. 2016) (quoting
Am. Prof’l Testing Serv. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc.,
108 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1997)).
251. Golden Boy Promotions, LLC v. Haymon, No. CV 15-3378-JFW, 2017 WL
460736, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2017). See Le, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (describ-
ing standard to demonstrate market power circumstantially).
252. See Golden Boy Promotions, 2017 WL 460736, at *11–*12 (describing insuf-
ficiency of plaintiffs’ expert’s findings).
253. Le, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1166 (holding there was sufficient evidence to
define relevant market).
254. Id. (holding there was sufficient evidence to define relevant market).
255. See id. at 1161 (stating market share of forty-four percent is sufficient, as
matter of law, to support finding of market power).
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has dominated the MMA world for years, is additional evidence to
support that the plaintiffs in Le have a much stronger argument
than the plaintiffs did in Golden Boy.256  This is most likely why the
plaintiffs in Le alleged actual monopolization, in contrast to the
plaintiffs in Golden Boy who alleged attempted monopolization.257
In regards to anticompetitive conduct, the plaintiffs in Golden
Boy failed to establish that the exclusive television agreements
Haymon signed with five networks were anticompetitive, and the
court stated “the reality of the extensive media platforms available
today, demonstrate that there are many alternative channels of dis-
tribution (both English-language, Spanish-language, and basic
cable) available to Golden Boy and other promoters.”258  This is not
a good sign for the plaintiffs in Le because the UFC currently has
only one exclusive deal with FOX Sports, which is much less than
the number of exclusive television deals that were signed by
Haymon.259  In fact, Bellator, the UFC’s largest rival, is owned by
media conglomerate Viacom and is aired frequently on channels
owned by the company.260  Golden Boy’s claims regarding venues
was also swiftly discarded by the court, which stated “there are nu-
merous alternative venues in most major metropolitan areas of the
United States.”261  This, too, is a bad sign for the Le plaintiffs be-
cause it is clearly extremely difficult to establish a venue blocking
claim given the sheer number of venues in the country.262
Despite the high standards set forth in Golden Boy to establish
anticompetitive locking up of television channels and venues, the
plaintiffs in Le are not without hope because they have a signifi-
cantly greater amount of evidence pertaining to anticompetitive
practices than the plaintiffs in Golden Boy had.263  Specifically, the
evidence of the coercive contract provisions, as well as additional
evidence and testimony regarding the UFC ostracizing fighters who
speak out against it, will strongly support the Le plaintiffs in their
256. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing FTC investigation of R
UFC).
257. See Golden Boy Promotions, 2017 WL 460736, at *2 (regarding attempted
monopolization); Le, 216 F. Supp. 3d at 11159 (regarding actual monopolization).
258. Golden Boy Promotions, 2017 WL 460736, at *15.
259. See id. at *5 (discussing networks airing PBC).
260. See Byron, supra note 91 (discussing Bellator).  For further discussion of R
Bellator, see supra note 92 and accompanying text. R
261. Golden Boy Promotions, 2017 WL 460736, at *16 (holding there are too
many alternative venues to sustain claim).
262. See id. (holding there are too many alternative venues to sustain claim).
263. See Le v. Zuffa, LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1167–68 (D. Nev. 2016) (spec-
ifying anticompetitive conduct).
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attempt to prove anticompetitive conduct by the UFC.264  Lastly,
unlike in Golden Boy, the plaintiffs in Le have clear standing to show
antitrust injury because, as fighters, rather than promoters, they are
not only more sympathetic, but they are the ones who were directly
hurt due to the artificial price controls imposed by the UFC.265
Unlike Golden Boy, the Ali Act is not at issue in Le.266  However,
the fact that the evidence shows that the UFC is a monopoly, and it
is likely the court will hold as much, lends further support to the
argument that the Ali Act should be expanded to MMA because
fighters like Le, Quarry, and Fitch are the types of individuals the
Ali Act was designed to protect.267  As noted previously, if applied to
MMA, the Ali Act would force the UFC to alter its coercive contract
provisions and disclose its finances during negotiations.268  These
two things would both monumentally change the sport and im-
prove the compensation and lives of the fighters.269  In regards to
rankings, the Ali Act would guarantee fighters are ranked fairly and
that top ranked fighters get title shots; however, it is unclear
whether the amended act would allow the UFC to retain the ability
to rank its own fighters and award its own belts, or if it would dele-
gate that authority to a sanctioning body.270  As far as the overall
health of the sport is concerned, an ideal alternative to the inde-
pendent sanctioning bodies that corrupted boxing would be if the
amended Ali Act required the UFC itself to abide by objective rank-
ings and to consult the rankings when determining who gets to
fight for the title.271
264. See id. (specifying anticompetitive conduct).
265. See id. at 1169 (stating that “[p]laintiffs allege multiple antitrust injuries”
related to UFC’s organization structure).
266. See id. at 1159 (“Plaintiffs bring antitrust action under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.”).
267. For further discussion of the Ali Act’s benefits for fighters, see supra
notes 108–117 and accompanying text. R
268. For further discussion of the UFC’s utilization of coercive contracts, see
supra notes 190–199 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of how applying the R
Ali Act to MMA would affect the UFC, see supra notes 206–229 and accompanying R
text.
269. For a discussion of how applying the Ali Act to MMA would affect the
UFC, see supra notes 206–229 and accompanying text. R
270. See Raimondi, supra note 98 (discussing rankings in UFC).  For further R
discussion of how applying the Ali Act would affect UFC’s ranking scheme, see
supra notes 220–224 and accompanying text. R
271. For further discussion of the negative impact of sanctioning bodies in
boxing, see supra notes 148–176 and accompanying text. R
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IV. CONCLUSION
In efforts to maximize popularity and fighter welfare, both pro-
fessional boxing and MMA should study one another if they seek to
better themselves.272  Boxing should embrace a more uniform sys-
tem under a strong banner similar to the UFC, with more meaning-
ful championship belts and less risk of conflicts of interest between
various promoters and sanctioning bodies, which is what Haymon’s
PBC is attempting to foster.273  As the court held in Golden Boy, an
organization like PBC does not violate the Sherman Act or the Ali
Act, and it is in fact exactly what boxing needs to create exciting
matchups and bring the sport back to the mainstream.274
In contrast to Golden Boy, Le demonstrates that the UFC has
been so successful that it is at serious risk of being held to be a
monopoly.275  Whether or not the court holds the UFC to be a mo-
nopoly however, Le reinforces the argument that it is necessary for
MMA to be subject to the Ali Act in order to protect fighters, who
have nowhere else to turn, from coercive UFC contracts.276  Under
the Ali Act, the UFC organization can still be successful, but the
fighters’ financial interests will also be protected.277  This would
fundamentally change the power dynamic in MMA and enable
fighters to act as true free agents who are not controlled for indefi-
nite periods of time, which would ultimately result in higher fighter
pay.278  In addition, a third party will control the rankings system,
which will ensure that the most deserving fighters are given title
shots, rather than the most popular fighters.279  With these
272. For further discussion of the comparison between boxing and MMA, see
supra notes 141–229 and accompanying text. R
273. For further discussion of PBC, see supra notes 118–131 and accompany- R
ing text.
274. For further discussion of Golden Boy, see supra notes 230–248 and accom- R
panying text.
275. For further discussion of Le, see supra notes 249–271 and accompanying R
text.
276. For further discussion of the Ali Act, see supra notes 108–117 and accom- R
panying text.  For a discussion of how applying the Ali Act to MMA would affect
the UFC, see supra notes 206–229 and accompanying text. R
277. See Gross, supra note 217 (citing U.S. Representative Markwayn Mullins). R
278. For further discussion of the Ali Act, see supra notes 108–117 and accom- R
panying text.
279. For further discussion of the Ali Act, see supra notes 108–117 and accom- R
panying text.
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changes, fighters in both boxing and MMA would be able to win
both inside and outside of the ring.280
Daniel L. Maschi*
280. For further discussion of these changes, see supra notes 272–279 and R
accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law.  I was inspired to write this article because of my passion for combat sports
and the law, and because of the profound impact that training in boxing and Muay
Thai has had on my life over the past decade.  I would like to thank God, my
parents Tom and Sandy, my grandparents Tom and Catherine, and my girlfriend
Jordan, all of whom have supported my academic pursuits and my writing.  I love
you.
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